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INTRODUCTION 
The most difficult tasks for firms involve forecasting, managing, 
and disclosing risks.  In the wake of the financial crisis, a serious exami-
nation of risk and risk management at publicly traded firms has occurred.  
After the crisis, much of the focus has been on new regulatory agencies 
and additional powers for existing regulators,1 while little energy has 
been expended on examining and improving the efficacy of the current 
securities risk-disclosure framework, which was intended to serve as a 
bulwark for investors.2  The landmark Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act created the Consumer Protection Financial 
Bureau and expanded the powers of the Securities Exchange Commis-
sion, yet in 2,319 pages of legislation, no provision was included to en-
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 1. See, e.g., Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); Helene Cooper, Obama Signs Overhaul of Financial System, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 21, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/business/22regulate.html; Edward Wyatt 
& David M. Herszenhorn, In Deal, New Authority Over Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2010, at 
A1 (“The final bill vastly expands the regulatory powers of the Federal Reserve and establishes a 
systemic risk council of high-ranking officials, led by the Treasury secretary, to detect potential 
threats to the overall financial system.”). 
 2. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2008); see also Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Informa-
tion Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417, 418 (2003) 
(“Disclosure is designed to solve the informational asymmetries that exist between companies and 
investors.  The logic is that by arming investors with information, mandatory disclosure promotes 
informed investor decision making, capital market integrity, and capital market efficiency.”). 
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hance risk disclosures.3  This Article seeks to fill that void by providing 
the first critical analysis and redesign of the existing risk-disclosure 
framework in light of new understandings in the interdisciplinary field of 
behavioral law and economics.  This Article contends that enhanced risk 
disclosures based on the behavioral tendencies of actual investors, not 
theoretically rational investors, can serve as a powerful, complementary 
risk-management tool in the modern financial-regulatory landscape. 
More specifically, this Article examines risk disclosures in the se-
curity filings of public firms, particularly those disclosures in the Risk 
Factors section of mandated periodic reports and prospectuses (hereinaf-
ter Risk Factors).4  In light of behavioral law and economics studies,5 this 
Article proposes an enhanced behavioral framework for securities risk 
that can improve risk awareness for investors and risk management for 
firms.  In doing so, this Article challenges the conventional wisdom that 
securities risk management should be done primarily through increased 
government oversight and enforcement and advocates for a better capture 
of disclosure as a risk-management tool for regulators and the regulated. 
In order to better capture the advantages of disclosure-based risk 
regulations given the behavioral tendencies of investors, this Article pro-
poses a behavioral framework for Risk Factors built on (1) the relative 
likelihood of the risks and (2) the relative impact of dynamic risks.  This 
framework makes risk disclosures more accessible and meaningful to 
investors and would serve as the new default for public firms.  An impor-
tant feature of the new default is that firms will be able to opt out of the 
new framework if they believe that the existing Risk Factors require-
ments are more appropriate.  But these firms would need to explain to 
investors why they opted out.  This new default framework would be 
spatially, optically, and substantively superior to the current framework 
for investors.6 
                                                 
 3. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 4. See Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2007) [hereinafter 503(c)].  
Admittedly, discussions of risks concerning an issuer and its offered securities exist in other sections 
of a registration statement, prospectus, annual report, or quarterly report.  For example, in the Man-
agement’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations section or 
MD&A section, certain types of market risks are disclosed.  Item 303(4) of Regulation S-K, 17 
C.F.R. § 229.303(4) (2007).  Nonetheless, the focus here is on the risk disclosures in the Risk Fac-
tors section given its prominent placement in SEC filings, its aggregated presentation format of an 
issuer’s risks, and the potential benefits that can be unlocked by improving it. 
 5. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1471 (1998); Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1551 (1998).  See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). 
 6. See infra Part IV. 
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Spatially, the proposed framework would require Risk Factors to 
appear as the first substantive item after the cover page or table of con-
tents of any prospectus, quarterly report on Form 10-Q, and annual report 
on Form 10-K.  Taking into account the heuristic of “anchoring,” the 
Risk Factors will serve as an anchor in the minds of investors as they 
read a firm’s later rosier disclosures.7 
Optically, Risk Factors will be presented in a standardized, menu-
like format based on relative likelihood and relative impact.8  Studies on 
framing effects suggest that this new menu-like framework would offer 
the investing public a form of risk disclosure that is easier to comprehend 
relative to the existing regime.9  Additionally, in order to better convey 
the dynamic nature of risk, the proposed framework would require that 
new or changed disclosures be underlined to make it easier for readers to 
identify amended disclosures. 
Substantively, the new default framework would require that Risk 
Factors be categorized in terms of relative likelihood and impact.10  
Firms that choose to adhere to the new default framework would have to 
classify their disclosed significant risks in terms of relative likelihood 
and impact based on three tiers for each metric.  Additionally, in order to 
better ensure the timeliness of risk disclosures, existing senior executive 
officer certifications will include specific language attesting to the 
“freshness” of the disclosed Risk Factors under the proposed framework. 
From the firm’s perspective, the new framework will also change a 
firm’s disclosure-drafting mindset.  Firms under the new framework 
would have to consider their risks more carefully because they would 
have to rank their disclosures.  This ranking would likely shift their draft-
                                                 
 7. See Susanna Kim Ripken, Predictions, Projections, and Precautions: Conveying Cautionary 
Warnings in Corporate Forward-Looking Statements, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 929, 986 (2005) (“Cau-
tionary language that is sufficient in form and content to catch the market’s attention, maintain that 
attention, and turn it toward a serious consideration of the risks provides a much-needed check on 
the market’s collective inclination to accept overly rosy forward-looking information.”); infra Part 
II.B.1.  See generally Peter A. Frensch, Composition During Serial Learning: A Serial Position 
Effect, 20 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION 423 (1994); Richard 
N. A. Henson, Short-Term Memory for Serial Order: The Start-End Model, 36 COGNITIVE 
PSYCHOL. 73 (1998). 
 8. Infra Part IV.B.2. 
 9. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of 
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 635 (1999) (“[W]e believe that market outcomes 
frequently will be heavily influenced, if not determined, by the ability of one actor to control the 
format of information, the presentation of choices, and, in general, the setting within which market 
transactions occur.”).  See generally Amos Tversky & Craig R. Fox, Weighing Risk and Uncertainty, 
102 PSYCHOL. REV. 269 (1995); Orit E. Tykocinski et al., Message Framing, Self-Discrepancies, 
and Yielding to Persuasive Messages: The Motivational Significance of Psychological Situations, 20 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 107 (1994). 
 10. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
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ing emphasis away from a litigation-avoidance posture to an informa-
tional posture, which will create disclosures that are more meaningfully 
compliant.  Disclosure then becomes more than a regulatory chore to be 
completed: it becomes a meaningful risk-management tool for firms.11  
Under the new framework, disclosure may also lead managers to rethink 
or avoid actions that will generate highly negative disclosures or riskier 
classifications.12  If done appropriately, the reconfigured framework can 
lead to better information for investors and better risk management for 
firms.13 
Structurally, the Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides an 
overview of the current Risk Factor framework and its underlying ratio-
nales.  Part II challenges the bedrock securities law assumption of the 
reasonable investor being a rational person by reintroducing the reasona-
ble investor as a predictably irrational person through a discussion of 
common cognitive limitations: biases, heuristics, and the framing effect, 
and how these affect risk assessment.  Part III critiques and describes key 
shortcomings of the current risk-disclosure framework.  Part IV proposes 
a behavioral framework configured around relative likelihood and rela-
tive impact of dynamic risks, and describes its key elements.  Part V ex-
amines how the behavioral framework would (1) lead to a better capture 
of securities disclosure; (2) create a more balanced appeal to the underly-
ing rationales for Risk Factors; (3) simplify transparency and increase 
financial literacy; (4) lower information costs for investors by requiring 
companies to enhance their publicly available risk disclosures; and 
(5) improve financial arbitrage.  The Article closes with a brief conclu-
sion. 
                                                 
 11. See Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 113, 123 (1999) (“When managers have the legal obligation to disclose certain information, 
they may have to gather and analyze information they would otherwise ignore.”). 
 12. See id. at 125 (“Required disclosure, therefore, will make her try harder to avoid actions 
that will generate negative information.”). 
 13. See MARC STEINBERG, CORPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS: A CORPORATE AND SECURITIES 
LAW PERSPECTIVE 29 (1983) (stating that a reconfigured framework can have a “positive role in 
influencing the establishment of improved standards of conduct.”); Susan Schmidt, Bies Keynote 
Address, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 81, 91–92 (2003) (“[R]isk management framework can 
improve the transparency of disclosures to help investors and customers better understand the opera-
tions of the firm. . . . [E]ach entity should disclose the information its stakeholders need to best eva-
luate the entity’s risk profile.”).  See generally William L. Cary, Corporate Standards and Legal 
Rules, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 408, 410–11 (1962); Arthur R. Pinto, The Nature of the Capital Markets 
Allows a Greater Role for the Government, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 77 (1989); Louis Lowenstein, Cor-
porate Governance and the Voice of the Paparazzi (Columbia Law Sch., Working Paper No. 132, 
1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=163386. 
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I.  THE CURRENT RISK-DISCLOSURE FRAMEWORK 
The current federal securities disclosure framework was created 
when Congress enacted the Securities Act of 193314 (the Securities Act) 
and the Securities Exchange Act of 193415 (the Exchange Act) in re-
sponse to the excesses and ruins of the Roaring Twenties and the Great 
Depression.16  The articulated intent of those landmark Acts was to 
“substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat 
emptor.”17 
The objective of the Securities Act is to ensure “full and fair disclo-
sure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce 
and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof.”18  The 
Securities Act mandates, with exceptions, the registration of any securi-
ties offerings that use any “means or instruments” in interstate com-
merce.19  Pursuant to its mandated registration process and its antifraud 
provisions, the Securities Act attempts to ensure that investors receive 
accurate and meaningful information about the offered securities and 
their issuing firms.20 
The Exchange Act, in turn, governs the subsequent trading of those 
securities in secondary markets.21  Like the Securities Act, the Exchange 
Act attempts to ensure that investors in those secondary markets receive 
accurate and meaningful information about the offered securities and 
their issuing firms.22  The Exchange Act works to achieve this purpose 
by requiring periodic reporting filings23 and by imposing a broad anti-
fraud provision in Section 10.24 
As a result of both Acts, firms are required to make timely disclo-
sures and periodically update them for the “proper protection of the in-
                                                 
 14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–aa (2000). 
 15. Id. §§ 78a–nn. 
 16. The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and 
Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (SEC), 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#create (last modified Sept. 20, 2010). 
 17. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963); 
see also Paredes, supra note 2. 
 18. Creswell-Keith, Inc. v. Willingham, 264 F.2d 76, 81 (8th Cir. 1959) (citing the preamble of 
the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74). 
 19. § 77e. 
 20. See id. § 77aa (setting forth the various line-item disclosures that are required for inclusion 
in the disclosure statement). 
 21. See id. §§ 78a–mm. 
 22. See id. § 78m(a)(1) (requiring public companies to “keep reasonably current the informa-
tion and documents required to be included in or filed with an application or registration statement,” 
as required by Section 12 of the Exchange Act). 
 23. See id. 
 24. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002) (outlining SEC Rule 10b-5, which is used to implement 
Section 10). 
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vestors and to insure fair dealings in the security.”25  These timely disclo-
sures consist of information such as a firm’s key contracts, employee 
headcounts, financial statements, and material risks.  These Acts also 
require firms’ disclosures to be timely, topical, periodically updated, and 
in “plain English.”26  But, in reality, disclosures regarding a firm’s risks 
are often stale, vague, uninformative, and in need of improvement. 
A.  Introduction to Risk Factors 
Under the Securities Act, most firms offering securities to the pub-
lic are required to file a registration statement.  This filing requires the 
disclosure of certain risks relating to the firm and of the offered securi-
ties.27  Following the Securities Offering Reform of 2005, the Exchange 
Act required similar Risk Factors to be included in a public firm’s annual 
reports on Form 10-K and quarterly reports on Form 10-Q.28  In theory, 
Risk Factors are intended to inform investors of each firm’s deepest fears 
and gravest vulnerabilities.29  The guidelines for such Risk Factors under 
the Securities Act and the Exchange Act are identical and spelled out in 
Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K as follows: 
Risk Factors. Where appropriate, provide under the caption “Risk 
Factors” a discussion of the most significant factors that make the 
offering speculative or risky.  This discussion must be concise and 
organized logically.  Do not present risks that could apply to any is-
suer or any offering.  Explain how the risk affects the issuer or the 
securities being offered.  Set forth each Risk Factor under a subcap-
tion that adequately describes the risk. . . . The Risk Factors may in-
clude, among other things, the following: 
1. Your lack of an operating history; 
2. Your lack of profitable operations in recent periods; 
                                                 
 25. § 78m. 
 26. 17 C.F.R. § 230.421(b) (“You must present the information in a prospectus in a clear, con-
cise and understandable manner.”); see also James A. Fanto, We’re All Capitalists Now: The Impor-
tance, Nature, Provision and Regulation of Investor Education, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 105, 166–
67 (1998) (“There is no question that the SEC’s ‘plain English’ writing principles and clarification 
standards, which are the foundations of good writing, will lead to, and have produced clearer, more 
understandable disclosure.”); Jeffrey M. McFarland, Warming Up To Climate Change Risk Disclo-
sure, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 281, 321 (2009) (“Plain English is particularly important as 
investors rely less on intermediaries to make their investment decisions.”). 
 27. See 503(c), supra note 4. 
 28. See Securities Offering Reform, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722 (Aug. 3, 2005). 
 29. 503(c), supra note 4; see, e.g., Oliver Kay, The Risk Business: Manchester United Re-
veal Their Worst Nightmares, THE TIMES, Jan. 13, 2010, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/sport/foot
ball/premier_league/manchester_united/article6985569.ece (In a proposed £500 million bond issue, 
Manchester United “acknowledge[d] the threats posed to the club by factors as diverse as Sir Alex 
Ferguson’s retirement, UEFA’s proposed ‘financial fair-play initiative,’ the boundless spending of 
their rivals—and even terrorism.”). 
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3. Your financial position; 
4. Your business or proposed business; or 
5. The lack of a market for your common equity securities or securi-
ties convertible into or exercisable for common equity securities.30 
In practice, most firms include Risk Factors in their annual reports 
on Form 10-K and then incorporate those same Risk Factors by reference 
into prospectuses and quarterly reports, unless they need to be updated.31  
Prospectuses also often include Risk Factors relating to a specific securi-
ties offering.  In terms of presentation format, many firms organize their 
Risk Factors into categories and then headline each Risk Factor with a 
caption in bold or italics, or both, followed by a few sentences of narra-
tive.  Below are two excerpted examples. 
Google disclosed the following risk in its initial-public-offering 
preliminary prospectus in 2004:32 
Risks Related to Our Business and Industry— 
We face significant competition from Microsoft and Yahoo. 
We face formidable competition in every aspect of our business, 
and particularly from other companies that seek to connect people 
with information on the web and provide them with relevant adver-
tising.  Currently, we consider our primary competitors to be Micro-
soft and Yahoo. . . . Both Microsoft and Yahoo have more em-
ployees than we do (in Microsoft’s case, currently more than 
20 times as many).  Microsoft also has significantly more cash re-
sources than we do.  Both of these companies also have longer op-
erating histories and more established relationships with customers.  
They can use their experience and resources against us in a variety 
of competitive ways, including by making acquisitions, investing 
more aggressively in research and development and competing 
more aggressively for advertisers and web sites.  Microsoft and Ya-
hoo also may have a greater ability to attract and retain users than 
we do because they operate Internet portals with a broad range of 
products and services.  If Microsoft or Yahoo are successful in pro-
viding similar or better web search results compared to ours or leve-
rage their platforms to make their web search services easier to 
access than ours, we could experience a significant decline in user 
traffic.  Any such decline in traffic could negatively affect our reve-
nues.  
 
                                                 
 30. 503(c), supra note 4. 
 31. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.411 (2005) (describing the practice of incorporation by reference). 
 32. Google Inc., Initial Public Offering (Form S-1), at 4 (Aug. 18, 2004). 
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Bear Stearns disclosed the following risk in its 2007 Annual Re-
port:33 
 
Our businesses could be adversely affected by market fluctuations.  
Our businesses are materially affected by conditions in the financial 
markets and economic conditions generally, both in the U.S. and 
elsewhere around the world.  In the event of a market downturn, our 
businesses could be adversely affected in many ways, including 
those described below.  Our revenues are likely to decline in such 
circumstances and, if we were unable to reduce expenses at the same 
pace, our profit margins would erode.  In addition, in the event of ex-
treme market events, such as the global credit crisis, we could incur 
significant losses.  Even in the absence of a market downturn, we are 
exposed to substantial risk of loss due to market volatility. 
 
While the two cited Risk Factors offer some helpful cautionary in-
formation, they, like many Risk Factors, have much room for improve-
ment in terms of substance and presentation.34 
B.  Rationales for Risk Factor Disclosures 
Disclosure is at the heart of the federal securities regulatory levia-
than.  Accurate and timely disclosure is intended to protect investors and 
to ensure fair dealings in securities.35  In connection with that noble in-
tention, Risk Factors are meant to serve as a “concise and organized” 
discussion of a firm’s risks and concerns.36  Risk Factors are primarily 
driven by three competing, crosscutting rationales: (1) to inform, (2) to 
comply, and (3) to shield. 
1. Information Rationale 
Disclosure is designed to provide investors with meaningful, high-
quality information.37  Akin to a doctor’s duty to provide a patient with 
                                                 
 33. The Bear Stearns Co. Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 15–16 (Mar. 31, 2008). 
 34. See Ripken, supra note 7 (“Effective risk disclosure can help, in part, to overcome some of 
the cognitive and motivational tendencies that might otherwise lead investors to rush headlong into 
investments without first confronting the downside potential.”). 
 35. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2008) (stating that every issuer needs to file annual reports for the 
protection of investors). 
 36. See 503(c), supra note 4. 
 37. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 276–314 (1991) (describing the goal of Risk Factors disclosures as being to pro-
vide information to investors); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case 
for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984); Marcel Kahan, Games, Lies, and 
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ample information to grant informed consent,38 a public firm has a duty 
to provide an investor with ample information to make a reasonable in-
vestment decision.  A combination of public and private enforcement 
mechanisms work to ensure that securities disclosures are of a reasonable 
quality.39  Such information is critical to the proper functioning of the 
securities markets.40  As the SEC noted on its website, “only through the 
steady flow of timely, comprehensive and accurate information can 
people make sound investment decisions.”41 
While some debate exists about the essential role of securities regu-
lations,42 little dispute exists about the important role of accurate, timely 
information in the financial markets.43  This importance is especially true 
when the information concerns the material risks facing firms.44 
                                                                                                             
Securities Fraud, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 750 (1992); Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a 
Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047 (1995). 
 38. See generally ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Med. Ctr., 81 Wash.2d 12, 23, 499 P.2d 1 (1972) 
(“Informed consent . . . is the name for a general principle of law that states that a physician has a 
duty to disclose what a reasonably prudent physician . . . in the exercise of reasonable care, would 
disclose to his patient as to whatever grave risks of injury may be incurred from a proposed course of 
treatment so that a patient, exercising ordinary care for his own welfare, and faced with a choice of 
undergoing the proposed treatment, or alternative treatment, or none at all, can, in reaching a deci-
sion, intelligently exercise his judgment by reasonably balancing the probable risks against the prob-
able benefits.”). 
 39. See WILLIAM M. SAGE, MILBANK MEM’L FUND, ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH 
INFORMATION: WHAT THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY CAN LEARN FROM SECURITIES REGULATION 
(2000) (“These statutes [the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] em-
phasize abundant and accurate information as the key to consumer protection, combined to varying 
degrees with direct regulatory oversight.”); Edward Rock, Securities Regulation As Lobster Trap: A 
Credible Commitment Theory of Mandatory Disclosure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 675, 686 (2002) 
(“[T]he public and private enforcement machinery of the securities laws and the combination of 
criminal and civil liability makes securities disclosures far more credible than purely contractual 
representations.”); Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Gover-
nance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 860–62 (2003) (highlighting the public 
and private enforcement mechanisms). 
 40. See Paredes, supra note 2 (“The logic is that by arming investors with information, manda-
tory disclosure promotes informed investor decision making, capital market integrity, and capital 
market efficiency.”); see also SAGE, supra note 39 (“Over the past half-century, this framework [of 
securities regulation] has accommodated tremendous growth in the capital markets, and has adapted 
to rapid changes in the mode and diversity of securities transactions.”). 
 41. See The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, 
and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified Sept. 20, 2010); see also Paredes, supra 
note 2. 
 42. See, e.g., Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regula-
tion, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 713–30 (2006); Homer Kripke, The SEC and Corporate Disclosure: Regula-
tion, in SEARCH OF A PURPOSE (1979); Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities 
Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1992) (discussing securities regu-
lation and the role of the efficient-market hypothesis); Rock, supra note 39. 
 43. See Ripken, supra note 7, at 955 (“The purpose of providing warning disclosures is to help 
investors and consumers evaluate the securities and products at issue.  The clear and comprehensible 
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2.  Compliance Rationale 
Compliance with the SEC’s mandatory disclosure rules grants firms 
access to funds in the public capital markets.45  Despite the loss of $6.9 
trillion in the financial crisis of 2008,46 the U.S. capital markets were still 
worth approximately $55 trillion at the end of 2008,47 making it one of 
the largest pools of capital for firms anywhere in the history of the world.  
Absent proper compliance, the SEC can deny a firm access to raise funds 
in American capital markets or can make it extremely cumbersome for a 
firm to proceed in its capital-raising efforts.48  Absent access to public 
monies, firms would have to incur significant transactional costs to raise 
capital for future investments and day-to-day operations.49 
3.  Shield Rationale 
Proper and robust disclosures often serve as an effective shield in 
securities-fraud litigation, which is a real concern for publicly traded 
firms.  Statistics from the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action 
Clearinghouse indicate that from 1998 to 2008, an average of 236 federal 
class action lawsuits were filed each year.50  Federal class actions are 
some of the most costly types of litigation for public firms.51  In addition 
                                                                                                             
disclosure of specific and nonobvious risks allows consumers and investors to make informed choic-
es about their future and about pursuing certain courses of action.”). 
 44. See id. 
 45. See, e.g., SAGE, supra note 39. 
 46. See Renae Merle, Wall Street’s Final ’08 Toll: $6.9 Trillion Wiped Out, WASH. POST, Jan. 
1, 2009, at A1 (“After months of tortuous trading, Wall Street rang out its worst year since the Great 
Depression yesterday, leaving shareholders $6.9 trillion the poorer.”). 
 47. See MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS: ENTERING A NEW ERA 9 
(Sept. 2009) (graphing the total financial assets per major region for 2008). 
 48. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(k) (1982); see also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, NO. 34-49546, 
TRADING SUSPENSION: WHISPERING OAKS INTERNATIONAL, INC., D/B/A BIOCUREX, INC. (Apr. 8, 
2005) (announcing the temporary suspension of trading of the securities of Whispering Oaks Inter-
national, Inc., d/b/a BioCurex, Inc.). 
 49. In the midst of the financial crisis in 2008, many companies, most notably the Big 3 auto-
makers, became paralyzed by the freeze in the credit markets.  As access to public monies became 
more expensive and difficult, many of these companies faced bankruptcies, cutbacks, and temporary 
shutdowns.  See, e.g., Sharon Terlep et al., GM’s Dismal Year: $30.9 Billion Loss, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
27, 2009, at B1; Parija B. Kavilanz, No. 2 Mall Operator Warns 
of Bankruptcy, CNNMONEY, Nov. 11, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/11/11/news/companies/gen
eral_growth/index.htm. 
 50. See generally STANFORD LAW SCHOOL SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE, 
INDEX OF FILINGS, http://securities.stanford.edu/companies.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2010). 
 51. See Securities Litigation Reform, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and 
Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 129–34 (1994) (tes-
timony of Janet Cooper Alexander, Professor of Law, Stanford Law School) [hereinafter Securities 
Litigation Hearings]; see also Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations When 
Issuers do not Trade?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 297, 306–07 (2009); Stephanie Plancich & Svetlana Sta-
rykh, Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation: 2009 Mid-
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to those cases, state court actions and individual federal civil actions 
have also been on the rise.52  Studies have shown that securities litigation 
amounted to $2.5 billion in legal fees annually in recent years.53  While 
no silver bullet exists for reducing securities-litigation exposure, robust 
Risk Factor disclosures can refute the commonly pleaded claims by 
shareholders who suggest that they were not properly warned about a 
risk that materialized.  Hence, practitioners often refer to Risk Factor 
disclosures as the “cheapest form of insurance.”54 
Furthermore, in reliance on the “bespeaks caution” doctrine, firms 
include “cautionary language in their disclosure documents with the 
hopes of shielding themselves from future liability.”55  The doctrine, 
which has been adopted by many courts since the 1990s, holds that 
statements in a firm’s offering documents relating to projections and ex-
pectations are not misleading and can be neutralized by sufficiently spe-
cific cautionary language disclosing potential risks.56  Additionally, the 
safe harbor provision for forward-looking statements in the Private Se-
curities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 also incentivizes the inclusion of 
cautionary statements in Risk Factors and other sections of a firm’s se-
curities filings.57 Cautionary language must be directed at forward-
                                                                                                             
Year Update, NAT’L ECON. RES. ASSOCS. (2009), http://www.nera.com/image/Recent_Trends_Repo
rt_0709.pdfhttp://www.nera.com/image/Recent_Trends_Report_0709.pdf. 
 52. See Securities Litigation Hearings, supra note 51; see also Fox, supra note 51, at 306–07; 
Plancich & Starykh, supra note 51. 
 53. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 51, at 306 (“In recent years in the United States, the lawyers’ fees 
on the two sides of securities litigation have alone, in the aggregate, averaged about $2.5 billion per 
year.”). 
 54. Robert B. Robbins & Philip L. Rothenberg, Securities Disclosure, Writing Effective Risk 
Factor Disclosure in Offering Documents and Exchange Act Reports, 19 INSIGHTS: CORP. & SEC. L. 
ADVISOR 1, 4 (May 2005). 
 55. Tom C. W. Lin, Undressing the CEO Disclosing Private, Material Matters of Public Com-
pany Executives, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 383, 407 (2009). 
 56. Id. at 407 n.152 (collecting cases). 
 57. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c) (2002) (setting forth the application of safe harbor for forward-
looking statements).  Microsoft, for example, includes the following note in its 2008 annual report 
on Form 10-K about forward-looking statements: 
Certain statements in this report, including estimates, projections, statements relating to 
our business plans, objectives and expected operating results, and the assumptions upon 
which those statements are based, are “forward-looking statements” within the meaning 
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Section 27A of the Securities 
Act of 1933 and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  Forward-looking 
statements may appear throughout this report, including without limitation, the following 
sections: “Business,” “Management’s Discussion and Analysis,” and “Risk Factors.” 
These forward-looking statements generally are identified by the words “believe,” 
“project,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “estimate,” “intend,” “strategy,” “future,” “opportuni-
ty,” “plan,” “may,” “should,” “will,” “would,” “will be,” “will continue,” “will likely re-
sult,” and similar expressions.  Forward-looking statements are based on current expecta-
tions and assumptions that are subject to risks and uncertainties which may cause actual 
results to differ materially from the forward-looking statements.  A detailed discussion of 
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looking statements58 and be meaningfully specific in order to be effec-
tive.59 
_____ 
Having introduced the existing framework, the next Part explores a 
fundamental shortcoming at the foundation of the framework: the myth 
of the über-rational investor. 
II. THE IRRATIONAL REASONABLE INVESTOR 
Beneath the core principle of disclosure in federal securities law is 
the assumption that the reasonable investor is the homo economicus, the 
idealized rational person from neoclassical economic theory.60  The nor-
mative extension of this assumption is that disclosure can serve as a 
strong and effective regulatory tool to protect investors because, once 
armed with the requisite information, “investors can protect themselves 
against corporate abuses and mismanagement.”61  In practice, this as-
sumption has produced a regulatory framework that emphasizes more 
information over less information, more disclosure over better disclosure, 
quantity over quality.62 Yet this regulatory framework ignores that real 
individuals and investors are not like their rational, neoclassical kin.63  
The rationality of real investors is bounded by biases, heuristics, and oth-
                                                                                                             
risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results and events to differ materially from 
such forward-looking statements is included in the section entitled “Risk Factors” (refer 
to Part I, Item 1A).  We undertake no obligation to update or revise publicly any forward-
looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events, or otherwise. 
Microsoft Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (June 30, 2009). 
 58. Lin, supra note 55, at 407 n.151 (citing cases). 
 59. Id. at 407 n.154 (citing cases). 
 60. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976) 
(“[A]ll human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who maximize their utility from a 
stable set of preferences and accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a 
variety of markets.”); Richard H. Thaler, Doing Economics Without Homo Economicus, in 
ECONOMICS: HOW DO ECONOMISTS DO ECONOMICS? 227, 230–35 (Steven G. Medema & Warren J. 
Samuels eds., 1996); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Female Investors and Securities Fraud: Is the 
Reasonable Investor a Woman?, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291, 297 (2009) (“Decisional law 
and the related literature support the view that the reasonable investor is a rational investor . . . .”); 
Peter H. Huang, Moody Investing and the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Materiality of Information 
and the Reasonableness of Investors, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 99, 111 (2005) (“[M]any courts ap-
pear to view the reasonable investor as referring to a normative idealized type of behavior, instead of 
a descriptive realistic depiction of actual behavior.”). 
 61. Paredes, supra note 2. 
 62. See id. at 418 (“Securities regulation is motivated, in large part, by the assumption that 
more information is better than less. Perhaps this is no surprise since the SEC’s chief regulatory tool 
is to require companies to disclose more.”). 
 63. See Jolls et al., supra note 5, at 1477–79 (discussing the cognitive limitations of individuals 
in contrast to the rational actor of neoclassical economics); see also Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral 
Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955) (same). 
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er cognitive limitations.64  Investors are generally too loss averse,65 over-
confident in their skills,66 and overoptimistic about future returns.67 
Additionally, investors are misled by framing effects and mental 
shortcuts.68  For example, “in early 1999, the stock of Mannatech Inc. 
shot up 368% in its first two days of trading when Internet-crazed traders 
mistakenly thought Mannatech was a technology stock; in fact, it is a 
marketer of laxatives and nutritional supplements.”69  As a result of the 
dissonance between the idealized rational person and the actual investor, 
disclosure—as a protective instrument—for investors has been severely 
blunted. 
But real people are not entirely irrational.  Their rationality, howev-
er, is imperfect and limited.  Real people have bounded rationality and, 
in many ways, are predictably irrational.70  Relative to designing regula-
tions for the rational person, designing regulations for real people is dif-
ficult. 
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, many neoclassical think-
ers, including Alan Greenspan and Richard Posner, have questioned the 
practicality of the assumption of the rational person as the reasonable 
investor in a self-correcting über-efficient marketplace.71  These doubts 
and denials of the über-rational individual model do not necessarily seek 
a wholesale rejection of the neoclassical model, but a refinement of it.  
The neoclassical model, while imperfect and impractical, remains incred-
                                                 
 64. Supra note 60. 
 65. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 66. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 67. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 68. See infra Parts II.B and II.C. 
 69. JASON ZWEIG, YOUR MONEY AND YOUR BRAIN: HOW THE NEW SCIENCE OF 
NEUROECONOMICS CAN HELP MAKE YOU RICH 31 (2008). 
 70. See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR 
DECISIONS 239 (2008) (“[W]e are really far less rational than standard economic theory assumes.  
Moreover, these irrational behaviors of ours are neither random nor senseless.  They are systemic, 
and since we repeat them again and again, predictable.”); Stephen Choi & Adam Pritchard, Beha-
vioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2003) (“These [cognitive] biases are not 
merely isolated quirks, rather, they are consistent, deep-rooted, and systemic behavior patterns.”); 
John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 669, 671, 682–83 (1996); Jolls et al., 
supra note 5, at 1475 (“Behavioral economics does not suggest that behavior is random or impossi-
ble to predict; rather it suggests, with economics, that behavior is systematic and can be modeled.”). 
 71. See The Financial Crisis and the Role of Fed. Regulators: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 17 (2008) (statement of Alan Greenspan) 
(Greenspan states that he “found a flaw in the [neoclassical] model that . . . defines how the world 
works.”); see also Richard A. Posner, How I Became a Keynesian, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 23, 
2009, at 34 (“We have learned since September that the present generation of economists has not 
figured out how the economy works.”).  See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF 
CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009). 
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ibly instructive.  To borrow Picasso’s description of art, the mythical ra-
tional person is “the lie that enables us to realize the truth.”72 
Nonetheless, some may contend that the fallacies of real people af-
fect only unsophisticated investors, so-called “noise traders,”73 and not 
sophisticated investors, so-called “information traders,”74 a close kin of 
the mythical rational person.  Thus, securities disclosure should be 
drafted for sophisticated investors rather than for all investors.75  Implicit 
in this contention is the belief that sophisticated investors are superior to 
the average individual investor, and the “smart money” of the sophisti-
cated will protect the “dumb money” of the unsophisticated through arbi-
trage and market efficiency.76  While a significant segment of investors 
act through more sophisticated agents, studies suggest that sophisticated 
investors do not necessarily outperform the average lay investor.77  So-
phisticated investors do not outperform their counterparts because they 
also suffer from cognitive limitations78 and because arbitrage has severe 
limitations.79  Additionally, real markets are not as elegantly efficient as 
their theoretical counterparts.80  And “smart money” and “dumb money” 
                                                 
 72. CLAUDIA E. CORNETT, THE ARTS AS MEANING MAKERS 190 (1998). 
 73. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 42, at 714–15 (“[N]oise traders, [are those] who act 
irrationally, falsely believing that they possess some valuable informational advantage or superior 
trading skills.”). 
 74. Id. at 714 (“[I]nformation traders, [are those] who specialize in gathering and analyzing 
general market and firm-specific information.”). 
 75. See id. (“[T]he role of securities regulation is to create and promote a competitive market 
for information traders.”). 
 76. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 70, at 3 (“[T]he unsophisticated therefore can rely on 
market efficiency to ensure that the price he pays for a security will be ‘fair.’ . . .  [T]he overwhelm-
ing influence of smart money actually indirectly protects the interests of the poorly informed, as 
evidenced by the burgeoning popularity of index funds.”). 
 77. See GARY BELSKY & THOMAS GILOVICH, WHY SMART PEOPLE MAKE BIG MONEY 
MISTAKES 162 (2009) (“In fact, in most years the majority of these professional managers actually 
perform worse than stocks in general.  Indeed, over periods of a decade or more, roughly 75 percent 
of all stock funds underperform the market.”); see also JOHN BOGLE, COMMON SENSE ON MUTUAL 
FUNDS: NEW IMPERATIVES FOR THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR 119 (1999) (charting the inferiority of 
actively managed mutual fund returns relative to the S&P 500 Index); M.P. Dunleavy, That Rush to 
Beat the Market, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2009, at BU22 (“In fact, numerous studies have shown that, 
despite investor willingness to pay higher fees and expenses for actively managed mutual funds, 
these funds rarely beat the market in the long term.”); Bill Barker, The Performance of Mutual 
Funds, THE MOTLEY FOOL, http://www.fool.com/school/mutualfunds/performance/record.htm (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2010) (“The average actively managed stock mutual fund returns approximately 2% 
less per year to its shareholders than the stock market returns in general.”). 
 78. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 70, at 2 (“There is evidence that supposedly sophisticated 
institutional investors—mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies—suffer from similar 
biases that impair their decisions.”). 
 79. See infra Part V.E. 
 80. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Froot & Richard H. Thaler, Foreign Exchange, in THE WINNER’S 
CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 182, 185–86 (Richard Thaler ed., 1992); 
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are not so readily delineated in the interconnected financial market-
place.81  So the “smart money” of sophisticated investors needs protec-
tion as well.82  Even if a few sophisticated investors have superior 
skills,83 recognizing and redressing the cognitive limitations of all inves-
tors lifts all boats (or yachts, as the case may be). 
Ultimately, because securities regulation is based on the mythical 
rational person, the regulation has been driven primarily by the assump-
tion that more information is better than less information, so emphasis is 
placed on more disclosure.84  Yet relatively little emphasis is placed on 
how that information is used and processed by real investors.85  Given 
the dissonance between the rational investor and the real investor, what 
good is an abundance of mandated disclosure if the information cannot 
be processed effectively because of cognitive limitations?86 
                                                                                                             
Thomas Russell & Richard H. Thaler, The Relevance of Quasi Rationality in Competitive Markets, 
in QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS 239, 248–49 (Richard Thaler ed., 1991). 
 81. See Heidi N. Moore, The Myth of the Sophisticated Investor, THE BIG 
MONEY, Apr. 27, 2010, http://www.thebigmoney.com/articles/judgments/2010/04/27/myth-
sophisticated-investor?page=full (suggesting that there is no difference between sophisticated inves-
tors and ordinary investors); President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Wall Street 
Reform (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-wall-street-
reform (“What happens on Wall Street has real consequences across the country, across our econo-
my. . . .  Because ultimately, there is no dividing line between Main Street and Wall Street.  We will 
rise or we will fall together as one nation.”). 
 82. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n. v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (1968) (“The 
speculators and chartists of Wall and Bay Streets are also ‘reasonable’ investors entitled to the same 
legal protection afforded conservative traders.”); Squawk Box (CNBC television broadcast Apr. 19, 
2010) (interviewing Barney Frank, Senator) [hereinafter Barney Frank Interview] (“[The rich and 
sophisticated] need protection . . . .  They are not just playing with their own money, they are playing 
with other people’s money and the societal impact of their error can be very great, so I think it rein-
forces the view that no, you can’t just leave the rich to their vices.”). 
 83. See, e.g., BELSKY & GILOVICH, supra note 77, at 162–63 (“Yes, a few fund managers con-
sistently outperform the market over time . . . [but] the fact of the matter is that most people have no 
reason to think that they can be more successful identifying worthy investments or timing the ups 
and downs of the stock and bond markets than they would be if they made their decisions by throw-
ing darts at the financial pages.”); Malcolm Baker et al., Can Mutual Fund Managers Pick Stocks? 
Evidence from Their Trades Prior to Earnings Announcements, 26 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 10,685, 2004), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10685.pdf. 
 84. See Paredes, supra note 2 (“Securities regulation is motivated, in large part, by the assump-
tion that more information is better than less.  Perhaps this is no surprise since the SEC’s chief regu-
latory tool is to require companies to disclose more.”). 
 85. See id. (“Relatively little attention is paid to how the information [that is disclosed to inves-
tors] is used—namely, how investors . . . search and process information and make decisions based 
on the information the federal securities laws make available.”); Jolls et al., supra note 5, at 1534 
(“‘Provide more information’ says nothing about the way in which the information will be provided, 
and yet we know from much of what has been said already, as well as from empirical work by scho-
lars such as W. Kip Viscusi, that this will matter a great deal.”). 
 86. See Jennifer O’Hare, Retail Investor Remedies Under 10b-5, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 521, 526 
(2008) (“Under this behavioral law and economics approach, individual investors, rather than behav-
ing as rational actors, are heavily influenced by a variety of biases that can lead to bad investment 
decisions.”); see also JONAH LEHRER, HOW WE DECIDE 153–54 (2009) (discussing various errone-
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Over the last few decades, behavioral economists and other aca-
demic researchers have identified common cognitive limitations of real 
people.  This research has undermined the rational person assumption by 
attempting to better augment choice architectures to account for those 
shortcomings.87  These limitations include (1) cognitive biases, 
(2) heuristics, and (3) framing effects. 
A.  Cognitive Biases 
Cognitive bias is a type of reflexive mental processing used for 
“quick, low-effort analysis.”88  Cognitive biases “are subconscious men-
tal processes that impair rational thought-processes and ultimately lead to 
‘irrational’ choices.”89  This section discusses four types of cognitive 
bias: overconfidence and overoptimism, status quo bias, loss aversion 
and the endowment effect, and confirmation bias. 
1.  Overconfidence & Overoptimism 
Despite facts to the contrary, individuals generally have an over-
abundance of confidence in their own abilities and an overabundance of 
optimism in their futures.90  For example, most Americans believe that 
                                                                                                             
ous sleight of mind accounting done by people); Paredes, supra note 2 (“[I]f the users do not process 
information effectively, it is not clear what good mandating disclosure does.”); W. Kip Viscusi, 
Individual Rationality, Hazard Warnings, and the Foundations of Tort Law, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 
625, 630–36 (1996). 
 87. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN & RICHARD H. THALER, NUDGE 33 (2009); Kent Greenfield & Peter 
C. Kostant, An Experimental Test of Fairness Under Agency and Profit-Maximization Constraints 
(With Notes on Implications for Corporate Governance), 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 983, 984 (2003) 
(“BLE scholars have given scholarly weight to the common-sense insight that individuals make 
decisions and act in the world on many different bases, only some of which can be described as 
driven by the self-interested pursuit of material utility that is traditionally termed ‘economic.’”); 
David A. Hoffman, The “Duty” to be a Rational Shareholder, 90 MINN. L. REV. 537, 546 (2006) 
(“Behavioral law and economics (BLE) undermines the rationality assumption by using data from 
psychological experiments to radically alter our view of how humans make choices. BLE documents 
how individuals’ choice-making behavior systematically diverges from the predictions of the ration-
al-actor model of human behavior.”); Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Les-
sons for Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 
CALIF. L. REV. 627, 635 (1996) (discussing that “[b]ehavioral decision theorists have generated a 
number of insights relating to decision making that might apply to investment behavior.”).  See 
generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1023 (2000); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the 
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1066 (2000). 
 88. Andrew E. Taslitz, Prosecutorial Preconditions to Plea Negotiations, 23 CRIM. JUST. 14, 
21 (2008). 
 89. Michael A. McCann, It’s Not About the Money: The Role of Preferences, Cognitive Biases, 
and Heuristics Among Professional Athletes, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1459, 1468 (2006). 
 90. See David A. Armor & Shelley E. Taylor, When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of Unrea-
listic Optimism, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 334, 334  
(Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (“One of the most robust findings in the psychology of predic-
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their marriages will last, even though 50% of all marriages end in di-
vorce or separation.91  Lottery players think that they have a reasonable 
chance at winning the jackpot in the face of astronomical odds to the 
contrary.92  Investors think that they have the ability to beat the market, 
despite statistics to the contrary.93  Investors buy volatile stocks without 
fully accounting for the risks, believing that they have superior strate-
gies.94  Investors hold on to bad investments for too long, unreasonably 
believing that they will turn around.95  Our overconfidence in our abili-
ties and overoptimism in our future causes us to unduly take risks.  Over-
confidence and overoptimism, therefore, are root causes for stock market 
bubbles and crashes.96 
2.  Status Quo Bias 
Individuals have a strong inclination to stick to their current situa-
tions, i.e., the status quo bias.97  Viewers stay on the same television 
                                                                                                             
tion is that people’s predictions tend to be optimistically biased.  By a number of metrics and across 
a variety of domains, people have been found to assign higher probabilities to their attainment of 
desirable outcomes than either objective criteria or logical analysis warrants.”). 
 91. See ROSE M. KREIDER & JASON M. FIELDS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NUMBER, TIMING, AND 
DURATION OF MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES: 1996 70–80 (2002) (highlighting the number of marriag-
es that end in divorce or separation). 
 92. See generally Edward J. McCaffery, Why People Play Lotteries and Why It Matters, 1994 
WIS. L. REV. 71 (1994) (discussing why people continue to play the lottery despite the fact that it is 
inherently difficult to actually win). 
 93. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 87, at 555 (“[M]ost investors mistakenly believe they can 
beat the market.”); Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Beha-
vioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 146–48 (2002); Don A. Moore et 
al., Positive Illusions and Forecasting Errors in Mutual Fund Investment Decisions, 79 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 95 (1999) (showing how investors tend to 
overestimate the performance of their investments); Glen Whyte et al., When Success Breeds Fail-
ure: The Role of Self-Efficacy in Escalating Commitment to a Losing Course of Action, 18 J. 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 415 (1997) (showing that having a higher view of personal self-efficacy 
that was built upon past success led investors to have  an irrational escalation of commitment). 
 94. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 87, at 555 (“[M]ost investors mistakenly believe they can 
beat the market.”); Langevoort, supra note 87, at 659–60 (finding that investors who have previously 
made good investing decisions overvalue their successes based on a perceived level of skill that they 
possess); Moore et al., supra note 93 (demonstrating how investors tend to overestimate the perfor-
mance of their investments); Ripken, supra note 7, at 961 (“The illusion of control causes investors 
to believe that positive investment outcomes are due to investors’ own skills and superior strategy, 
rather than good luck.”). 
 95. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 70, at 13 (“When investors’ stocks have lost value, they 
may hold onto the stocks longer than warranted in hope of reversing the losses.  Conversely, inves-
tors that make large investment gains may not value the gains as highly, taking on added risk with 
their gains . . . .”). 
 96. See generally Robert J. Shiller, Measuring Bubble Expectations and Investor Confidence, 1 
J. PSYCHOL. & FIN. MARKETS 49 (2000) (discussing the effect of investor confidence on market 
bubbles). 
 97. See generally William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision 
Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988). 
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channel after watching a favorite show even though they may not be par-
ticularly interested in the next show.98  Investors tend to stay with their 
initial 401(k) allocations despite changes in the market and their lives.99  
In short, the status quo bias causes us to make choices without thinking 
and to remain static in a changing world. 
3.  Loss Aversion & The Endowment Effect 
Individuals are loss averse.100  They do not assign static values to 
objects; and when they give up or lose something, “they are hurt more 
than they are pleased if they acquire the very same thing.”101  The nega-
tive impact of a loss is greater than the positive impact of an equal 
gain.102  In fact, studies have shown that the negative impact of a loss 
may be two times greater than the positive impact of gain.103 
Related to loss aversion, the endowment effect104 is the idea that 
“people tend to value goods more when they own them than when they 
do not.”105  A practical result of the endowment effect is the “‘offer-
asking gap,’ which is the empirically observed phenomenon that people 
                                                 
 98. See John W. Emerson & Ron Shachar, Cast Demographics, Unobserved Segments, and 
Heterogeneous Switching Costs in a Television Viewing Choice Model, 37 J. MARKETING RES. 173 
(2000) (defining a new model to determine television viewers’ preferences); Srinivas K. Reddy et 
al., SPOT: Scheduling Programs Optimally for Television, 44 MGMT. SCI. 83 (1998); Roland T. Rust 
& Mark I. Alpert, An Audience Flow Model of Television Viewing Choice, 3 MARKETING SCI. 113 
(1984). 
 99. See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron, 
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1162–66 (2003) (finding that individuals are slow to join 401(k) plans that 
offer more choices because they are prone to procrastination); Sheena S. Iyengar et al., How Much 
Choice Is Too Much? Determinants of Individual Contributions in 401(k) Retirement Plans (Pension 
Res. Council, Working Paper No. 2003-10, 2003) (discussing how people tend to stick with the 
401(k) option that they already have if they are faced with multiple 401(k) options). 
 100. See LEHRER, supra note 86, at 76 (discussing the mental limitation of loss aversion).  See 
generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-
Dependent Model, 106 Q. J. ECON. 1039 (1991). 
 101. SUNSTEIN & THALER, supra note 87, at 33. 
 102. See Samuel Issacharoff, The Content of Our Casebooks: Why do Cases get Litigated?, 29 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1265, 1276 (2002) (“[W]e know that contrary to what economists would tell us, 
people value losses more than gains and that they will invest more heavily in seeking to avoid a loss 
than realize a gain, even of equal value.”). 
 103. See SUNSTEIN & THALER, supra note 87, at 33; Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental 
Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990) (finding that 
the seller of an object valued it twice as much as the potential purchaser); Richard H. Thaler, Toward 
a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 44–45 (1980). 
 104. See Issacharoff, supra note 102; Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement 
Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 401 (1981) (explaining the endowment effect using the 
“offer-asking problem”); Thaler, supra note 103, at 44 (defining “endowment effect”). 
 105. Russell Korobkin, A New Social Scientific Assessment of Law and Human Behavior: The 
Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (2003); see also Kahneman et 
al., supra note 103, at 1341–46 (further explaining the endowment effect). 
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will often demand a higher price to sell a good that they possess than 
they would pay for the same good if they did not possess it at present.”106 
Loss aversion and the endowment effect produce inertia and cause 
people to resist change, even if change is clearly in their favor.  Home-
owners overvalue their homes and do not accept reasonable offers, often 
to their detriment.107  Investors overvalue losing positions and hold on to 
them for too long in order to avoid realizing losses.108  One study indi-
cated that household “investors are 32% less likely to sell a stock after a 
sharp fall in price than after a rise.”109  Another study indicated that pro-
fessional money managers “cling to their losing stocks for an average of 
fifty-five days, more than twice as long as they hold winners.”110  In 
short, loss aversion and the endowment effect often prevent people from 
doing what is in their best interests. 
4.  Confirmation Bias 
Individuals search for, remember, and interpret information in a 
manner that confirms their preconceptions.111  This cognitive limitation is 
known as the confirmation bias.112  When individuals favor a certain se-
lection, be it a stock pick, political candidate, or public policy,113 they 
                                                 
 106. Korobkin, supra note 105.  See generally Jennifer Arlen et al., Endowment Effects Within 
Corporate Agency Relationships, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2002). 
 107. See Korobkin, supra note 105 (stating that a person might prefer a house in the city, but 
when the person moves from a city house to a country house, that person begins to value the country 
house a lot more than when that person lived in the city); see also Issacharoff, supra note 102, at 
1276–77 (finding that people are reluctant to sell their houses in a declining market because they do 
not want to suffer a loss that is greater than what they perceive they should lose on the house). 
 108. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 70, at 13; Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The 
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 715, 
732 (2003) (“If one imagines the endowment effect is at work on target shareholders, then they may 
require too high a price for their stock, and mistakenly let a good offer pass.”); Hoffman, supra note 
87, at 553 (finding that people “hold ‘under water’ stocks for longer [than they should], in the hope 
of reversing the tide”); Issacharoff, supra note 102 (“[P]eople tend to hold losing stocks too long and 
sell winners too quickly. . . .”). 
 109. ZWEIG, supra note 69, at 197.  The study that Zweig discusses is Mark Grinblatt & Matti 
Keloharju, What Makes Investors Trade?, 56 J. FIN. 589, 600 (2001). 
 110. ZWEIG, supra note 69, at 197. 
 111. See generally Margit E. Oswald & Stefan Grosjean, Confirmation Bias, in COGNITIVE 
ILLUSIONS: A HANDBOOK ON FALLACIES AND BIASES IN THINKING, JUDGMENT AND MEMORY 79 
(Rüdiger F. Pohl ed., 2004); Jane Risen & Thomas Gilovich, Informal Logical Fallacies, in 
CRITICAL THINKING IN PSYCHOLOGY 110 (Robert J. Sternberg ed., 2007). 
 112. See Jason Zweig, How To Ignore the Yes-Man In Your Head, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2009, 
at A13 (describing a study that found “people are twice as likely to seek information that confirms 
what they already believe as they are to consider evidence that would challenge those beliefs.”). 
 113. Commentators have suggested that the confirmation bias contributed to the Iraq War 
because key decision makers selectively searched for and interpreted information to support their 
premise that Iraq posed an imminent security threat, and that they acted upon that bias, while ignor-
ing contrary evidence.  See Seymour M. Hersh, Selective Intelligence, THE NEW YORKER, May 12, 
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tend to search for and find characteristics that validate their positions and 
undervalue those that are contrary.114 
Confirmation bias can lead to suboptimal decisions in the invest-
ment context.  It can also influence investors to invest more money in a 
bad asset because they selectively see only those signs that affirm their 
initial selection of that asset.115  For example, if you believe that bank 
stocks are going to rise in the near term, suddenly it seems like most of 
the financial press is filled with similar sentiments.116 
B.  Heuristics 
Heuristics are mental shortcuts or “rules of thumb” that require lit-
tle information and allow individuals to make swift decisions and judg-
ments.117  While heuristics can be helpful in aiding individuals to simpli-
fy complex circumstances and make timely decisions,118 they can also 
mislead individuals because mental shortcuts may prevent people from 
making optimal decisions.  Four prominent types of heuristics are dis-
cussed here: anchoring, availability, representativeness, and herd beha-
vior. 
                                                                                                             
2003, http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/05/12/030512fa_fact; see also BOB WOODWARD, 
STATE OF DENIAL: BUSH AT WAR PART III 231 (2008) (“The controversy over the president’s refer-
ence to the discredited Iraq-Niger uranium deal was gaining steam, and fast becoming a symbol of 
both the failure to find WMD, and the suspicion that the president had cherry-picked intelligence to 
make the case for war.”). 
 114. See Hoffman, supra note 87, at 555 (stating that investors validate their beliefs through 
“privately acquired information” and believe that the companies they invest in are better than other 
companies in the same field); see also Langevoort, supra note 87, at 146 (“[Investors] put too much 
weight on their privately acquired information or inference, and calibrate poorly even when they 
realize the presence of some uncertainty.”). 
 115. See Zweig, supra note 112 (“[A person’s mind acts] like a compulsive yes-man [that] 
echoes whatever [that person wants] to believe.”). 
 116. See LEHRER, supra note 86, at 67 (“The danger of the stock market, however, is that 
sometimes its erratic fluctuations can actually look predictable, at least in the short term. . . . Instead 
of seeing randomness, we come up with imagined systems and see meaningful trends where there 
are only meaningless streaks.”). 
 117. ROY F. BAUMEISTER & BRAD J. BUSHMAN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND HUMAN NATURE 
161 (2007) (“Heuristics [are] mental shortcuts [that] provide quick estimates (though sometimes 
inaccurate ones) for decisions about uncertain events.”); James H. Kuklinski & Paul Quirk, Reconsi-
dering the Rational Public: Cognition, Heuristics, and Mass Opinion, in ELEMENTS OF REASON: 
COGNITION, CHOICE, AND BOUNDS OF RATIONALITY 153 (Arthur Lupia et al. eds., 2000). 
 118. GERD GIGERENZER, GUT FEELINGS, 16–19 (2007) (explaining the benefits of unconscious 
intelligence such as “gut feelings” and heuristics). 
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1.  Anchoring 
Anchoring describes the process of interpreting information 
through the lens of information that was received immediately prior.119  
Suppose you were planning to give money to a political candidate but 
were unsure about how much to give.  Brochure A suggests a range of 
options: $100, $300, $500, and “other amount.”  Brochure B suggests a 
range of options: $25, $50, $75, and “other amount.”  Evidence shows 
that the more money asked for, within reason, the more you are likely to 
receive.120  This result is due to “anchoring and adjustment,”121 where 
individuals start with some baseline reference point and then adjust in the 
direction they believe is appropriate.122 
Anchoring can mislead people because their adjustments are often 
insufficient or because they are influenced by irrelevant anchors.123  For 
example, the high price of a dress in one store can affect a consumer’s 
valuation and willingness to pay for a music CD in an adjacent store, 
even though the items are completely unrelated.124  Moreover, anchoring 
can cause people to make initial judgments that “prove remarkably resis-
tant to further information, alternative modes of reasoning, and even log-
ical or evidential challenges.”125  In the investment context, investors 
may hold on to losing positions because they are anchored to either the 
initial purchase price or their initial favorable impression. 
2.  Availability 
Individuals assess the likelihood of a particular risk based on how 
readily examples come to mind rather than the risk’s actual probabili-
ty.126  The more accessible and salient the example, the more weight that 
example is given.127  “If people can easily think of relevant examples, 
                                                 
 119. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by Representativeness, 185 SCI. 
1124, 1128 (1974). 
 120. See SUNSTEIN & THALER, supra note 87, at 24. 
 121. See id. at 23. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See id. at 23–24; see also Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 119, at 1128 (describing how 
anchors have the potential to mislead people). 
 124.  See generally Rashmi Adaval & Kent B. Monroe, Automatic Construction and Use of 
Contextual Information for Product and Price Evaluations, 28 J. OF CONSUMER RES. 572 (2002); 
Joseph C. Nunes & Peter Boatwright, Incidental Prices and Their Effect on Willingness to Pay, 41 J. 
OF MARKETING RES. 457, 458 (2004) (describing studies showing that irrelevant anchors influence 
the amount that people are willing to pay for certain goods). 
 125. RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS 
OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 41 (James J. Jenkins et al. eds., 1980). 
 126. See SUNSTEIN & THALER, supra note 87, at 25. 
 127. See id. 
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they are far more likely [to be] frightened and concerned than if they 
cannot,” regardless of what the empirical evidence suggests.128 
The availability heuristic can lead to an availability cascade, where 
popular perceptions and misperceptions are trapped in a self-reinforcing 
cycle that results in an erroneous collective belief.129  In the investment 
context, the availability heuristic can lead to bubbles and crashes, as bad 
information becomes amplified in a vicious informational cycle.130 
In sum, the availability heuristic can lead us to overreact to risks 
that are not as likely as we perceive them to be and underreact to risks 
that are likely but less salient.131 
3.  Representativeness 
The representativeness heuristic makes us judge objects and events 
as similar based on relatively artificial, “representative” characteristics, 
regardless of their actual similarity.132  This heuristic results in individu-
als inferring a great deal of information “about an object, a being, a pat-
tern of behavior, or a set of results based on their similarities to other 
                                                 
 128. Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: 
The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1437 (1983) (“The ‘avail-
ability heuristic’ can cause persons to make mistakes about the frequency with which events occur.  
One making inferential judgments by use of this heuristic tends to ignore statistical data in favor of 
evidence that seems germane and is ‘in awareness’—is available.”); see also Jolls et al., supra note 
4, at 1537 (“[V]ivid and personal information will often be more effective than statistical evidence 
[because] of the availability heuristic, people will tend to respond to it by attaching a higher proba-
bility to the event in question.”). 
 129. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 683, 713 (1999) (“[I]nsofar as people lack independent means of judging a claim’s 
validity, there is a danger that the beliefs generated by a cascade will be factually incorrect.  Millions 
of individuals may develop erroneous beliefs simply by giving each other reasons to adopt and pre-
serve them.”). 
 130. See, e.g., ROBERT SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 171–90 (2000) (analyzing the 
origins of stock market bubbles); Huang, supra note 60, at 121 (“Overall, the availability heuristic 
suggests that whatever piece of information becomes uppermost in the minds of an audience, wheth-
er due to primacy, recentness, typicality, or some other such effect, is perceived disproportionately 
and comes to carry more weight than less activated pieces of information.”). 
 131. The availability heuristic also causes individuals to exaggerate the predictability of an 
event after it happens, a cognitive deficiency known as hindsight bias.  This bias further stunts an 
individual’s ability to make optimal decisions as they rationalize previous bad decisions. See John C. 
Anderson et al., Evaluation of Auditor Decisions: Hindsight Bias Effects and the Expectation Gap, 
14 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 711, 722 (1993) (finding that peer reviewers are more likely to evaluate a 
particular audit procedure negatively if they are told of allegations that the auditor lacked indepen-
dence); Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight Is Not Equal to Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge 
on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & 
PERFORMANCE 288, 288 (1975); Erik Holzl et al., Hindsight Bias in Economic Expectations: I Knew 
All Along What I Want to Hear, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 437, 440–42 (2002). 
 132. MICHAEL KAPLAN & ELLEN KAPLAN, BOZO SAPIENS 42 (2009); Tversky & Kahneman, 
supra note 119, at 1124. 
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such objects, beings, patterns, and sets.”133  This heuristic can cause indi-
viduals to see patterns in randomness and assign similarities to things 
that are actually different.  A gambler playing roulette may think that the 
table is “due for red” because the previous ten spins were all black.134  
An investor may think that a firm named Typewriters.com is a growth 
stock because it has “dot.com” in its name.135  The gambler and the in-
vestor are both wrong because they have been misled by the representa-
tiveness heuristic. 
4.  Herd Behavior 
Herd behavior is the notion that people tend to behave in a certain 
way because others are acting and thinking similarly.136  In the political 
context, herd behavior can lead to a bandwagon effect for candidates 
who are perceived to be winning, even if they are not.137  In the consumer 
context, herd behavior can lead to trends and fads that cause people to 
purchase items that they do not want or need.138  In the investment con-
text, herd behavior can lead to stock market bubbles.139  This heuristic 
                                                 
 133. BELSKY & GILOVICH, supra note 77, at 13. 
 134. NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 125, at 25 (stating that an example of the representativeness 
heuristic is the “gamblers’ fallacy” where, “[a]fter observing a long run of ‘red’ on a roulette wheel, 
people believe that ‘black’ is now due, because the occurrence of black would make the overall 
sequence of events more representative of the generating process than would the occurrence of 
another red.”). 
 135. See ZWEIG, supra note 69, at 8 (“In 1999, the stock of Computer Literacy Inc. shot up 
33% in a single day, purely because the company changed its name to the more hip-sounding fat-
brain.com.  During 1998 and 1999, one group of stocks outperformed the rest of the technology 
industry by a scorching 63 percentage points—merely by changing their corporate names to include 
.com, .net, or internet.”). 
 136. See generally ROBERT PRECHTER, THE WAVE PRINCIPLE OF HUMAN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 
152–53 (1999); Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q. J. ECON. 797 (1992); 
Laurens Rook, An Economic Psychological Approach to Herd Behavior, 40 J. ECON. ISSUES 75 
(2006). 
 137. See generally Robert K. Goidel & Todd G. Shields, The Vanishing Marginals, the Band-
wagon, and the Mass Media, 56 J. POL. 802 (1994); Albert Mehrabian, Effects of Poll Reports on 
Voter Preferences, 28 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2119 (1998); Richard Nadeau et al., New Evidence 
About the Existence of a Bandwagon Effect in the Opinion Formation Process, 14 INT’L POL. SCI. 
REV. 203 (1993). 
 138. See generally Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cul-
tural Change as Informational Cascade, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992 (1992); Harvey Leibenstein, Band-
wagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers’ Demand, 64 Q. J. ECON. 183 (1950); 
Vicki G. Morwitz & Carol Pluzinski, Do Polls Reflect Opinions or Do Opinions Reflect Polls?, 23 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 53 (1996). 
 139. See, e.g., SHILLER, supra note 130, at 149–53 (describing how crowd behavior can poten-
tially have an effect on market dynamics). 
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can lead people astray and cause them to make harmful, irrational deci-
sions.140 
C.  Framing Effects 
Framing refers to the constructs of context and presentation,141 
which can affect how people process information and make decisions.  
Framing, although superficial in nature, can have substantive implica-
tions on serious matters like presidential elections, consumer habits, and 
retirement investments.  Advertisers, political strategists, and linguists 
have long known about the effects of framing142  The “estate tax” has 
become the “death tax.”143  The Association of Trial Lawyers of America 
is now known as the American Association of Justice.144  Gambling is 
now marketed as gaming.145 
While framing can be used for improper purposes, it can also be 
used to augment choice architectures, change the circumstances in which 
people make decisions,146 and enhance the presentation and context of 
information, which helps people make decisions that are in their best in-
terests.147  Consider the San Marcos Power Experiment, where research-
ers used framing to increase energy conservation.148  In the experiment, 
not only did researchers inform households about the level of their ener-
gy consumption, but also the average energy consumption levels of their 
                                                 
 140. See generally Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and Competitive 
Price Systems, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 246 (1976); John D. Hey & Andrea Morone, Do Markets Drive 
out Lemmings—or vice versa?, 71 ECONOMICA 637 (2004). 
 141. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of 
Choice, 211 SCI. 453 (1981) (describing the concept of “framing”). 
 142. See Hoffman, supra note 87, at 558 (“Perceptions of risks and benefits are subject to 
manipulation by corporations because of the existence of the so-called ‘framing effect.’”); Matt Bai, 
The Framing Wars, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 15, 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/17/magazine/17DEMOCRATS.html (showing how framing has 
been applied in the political context). 
 143. See Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Boards and the New Environmentalism, 31 WM. & 
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 291, 302 n.82 (2007) (“[P]oliticians often utilize phrases and evoca-
tive words to shape new attitudes about old ideas.  [After such framing takes hold, the] estate tax 
becomes the ‘death tax.’”). 
 144. See Aziz Rana, Statesman or Scribe? Legal Independence and the Problem of Democratic 
Citizenship, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1665, 1667 (2009) (“In an effort to improve its public image, the 
Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA) recently changed its name to the far vaguer Amer-
ican Association of Justice.”). 
 145. See James H. Frey, Gambling: Socioeconomic Impacts and Public Policy, 556 ANNALS 8, 
10 (1998) (“Corporate marketing efforts have created an image of gambling, or ‘gaming’ as the 
industry now prefers, as a desirable recreational activity that is most enjoyed in settings that remind 
one of Disneyland rather than a backroom bar.”). 
 146. SUNSTEIN & THALER, supra note 87, at 3. 
 147. See id. at 83–102. 
 148. P. Wesley Schultz et al., The Constructive, Destructive, and Reconstructive Power of 
Social Norms, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 429 (2007). 
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neighbors.149  The households that found themselves using relatively less 
energy started to use more energy, and vice versa.150  Next, the research-
ers added happy faces, ☺, to the bills of low-energy-consumption house-
holds, and sad faces, /, to bills of high-consumption households.  The 
above-average households decreased their consumption dramatically, 
and the below-average households continued to conserve energy.151  This 
experiment shows that the way information is framed can lead to signifi-
cant changes in behavior without any real change to the information it-
self.152 
In the investment context, prospectuses for securities can be re-
framed to enhance the presentation to make it more meaningful and help-
ful for investors.153  For example, comparable benchmarks presented in a 
standardized format make it easier for investors to compare companies 
based on a single metric, such as credit ratings risk. 
_____ 
Because of these cognitive limitations, real people—real inves-
tors—are inherently not good at assessing risks.154  The next section cri-
tiques the effectiveness of the current risk-disclosure framework in light 
of the cognitive limitations discussed here. 
III. CRITIQUES & SHORTCOMINGS 
The current disclosure framework is an unfinished and imperfect 
one.  It needs constant review and change to account for the evolving 
marketplace.155  The recent financial crisis exposed many of the unad-
dressed risks of certain financial instruments and the financial system.156  
                                                 
 149. Id. at 430–31. 
 150. Id. at 432–33. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See infra Part III for a critique of the current risk-disclosure framework. 
 154. See Hoffman, supra note 87, at 549 (“Individuals are exceptionally poor at evaluating risk 
and uncertainty.”); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 17, 20 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 
2000); Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119, 1128–29 (2002) (reviewing 
PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (2000)) (“[M]any people appear to believe that risk is an 
‘all or nothing’ matter; something is either safe or dangerous, and there is no middle ground.”); 
Viscusi, supra note 86, at 630–36. 
 155. See Rock, supra note 39, at 686.  See generally Lowenstein, supra note 13. 
 156. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on 21st Century Financial Regulatory 
Reform (June 17, 2009) (“In recent years, financial innovators, seeking an edge in the marketplace, 
produced a huge variety of new and complex financial instruments. And these products, such as 
asset-based securities, were designed to spread risk, but unfortunately ended up concentrating 
risk.”); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Lessons of the Financial Crisis for Banking Su-
350 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:325 
Over the last few decades, public firms, financial instruments, and the 
financial system have grown more complex, and the investor base has 
grown larger and less sophisticated, yet the system has not reacted to 
these changes in a timely manner.157  This problem is exacerbated by the 
fact that these disclosure rules were founded upon economic theories that 
new research suggests are not descriptively accurate of actual market 
behavior.158 
Building upon the discussion about investors’ cognitive limitations, 
this Part discusses four key shortcomings and critiques of the current 
framework.  The framework is (1) nebulous in presentation, (2) silent on 
likelihood and impact, (3) opaque on risk dynamics, and (4) vague in 
substance. 
A.  Nebulous in Presentation 
The current Risk Factors framework lacks clarity in its presentation 
format.  While Regulation S-K requires that Risk Factors be “concise and 
organized logically,”159 Risk Factors often lack organizational uniformity 
and are uninformative on key aspects of disclosed risks.  The current 
presentation lacks a uniform standard and frequently amounts to a “data 
                                                                                                             
pervision (May 7, 2009) (“The crisis exposed the inadequacy of the risk-management systems of 
many financial institutions.”); Timothy F. Geithner, U.S. Sec’y of the Treasury, The Current Finan-
cial Challenges: Policy and Regulatory Implications (Mar. 6, 2008) (“The crisis exposed a range of 
weaknesses in risk management practices within financial institutions in the United States and 
throughout the world.”). 
 157. See SHILLER, supra note 130, at 25–28 (discussing the impact of the post-World War II 
baby boom on the stock market); Geithner, supra note 156 (“The typical arsenal of risk management 
tools relies, by necessity, on history and experience, and as a result has only limited value in assess-
ing the scale of potential future losses.  These limitations were particularly damaging in a period in 
which significant innovation in financial instruments and market structure was coupled with relative-
ly stable macroeconomic and financial conditions.  Uncertainty about the future, and the greater 
complexity of leveraged structured products, created a dense fog around estimates of potential loss, 
making institutions and markets more vulnerable to an adverse surprise when conditions changed, 
and making it harder to manage the many principal agent problems inherent in the financial busi-
ness.”); Lin, supra note 55, at 389–92 (describing the system’s lack of reaction to the complexities 
of the evolving financial system). 
 158. See Ken Gregory & Steve Savage, Why We Prefer Funds, KIPLINGER’S PERS. FIN. MAG., 
Aug. 2002, at 59 (“Behavioral Finance demonstrates that all investors are hard-wired in certain ways 
that greatly increase the probability they will make poor investment decisions.”); O’Hare, supra note 
86, at 526 (“Behavioral finance scholars have shown that retail investors who do trade behave irra-
tionally.”). See generally ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE VOLUME II (Richard H. Thaler 
ed. 2005); INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000); ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT 
MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (Richard H. Thaler ed. 1993); SHILLER, 
supra note 130; Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 59 (2003). 
 159. 503(c), supra note 4. 
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dump.”160  While some firms attempt to organize their Risk Factors by 
categories, those categories are ad hoc because the rules do not encour-
age or require specific categories.  Alternatively, some firms simply 
enumerate their risks without any rhyme or reason.161 
Presentational frames matter a great deal in affecting how we assess 
risks and make decisions.162  Numerous studies have shown the impact of 
framing effects on how we invest, consume, and vote.163  In the securities 
context, many commentators, including SEC Commissioner Troy Pa-
redes, have suggested that greater emphasis needs to be placed on the 
presentation and end-user utility of securities disclosure.164  For example, 
uniformity in disclosure formats makes it easier for investors to compare 
companies based on one or more benchmarks.165 
B.  Silent on Likelihood and Impact 
The current Risk Factors framework is silent on two key issues re-
garding articulated risks: relative likelihood and relative impact.  Rela-
tive likelihood compares the probability of an articulated risk to other 
risks.  Relative impact compares the severity of the impact when an arti-
                                                 
 160. Michael R. Siebecker, Trust & Transparency: Promoting Efficient Corporate Disclosure 
Through Fiduciary-Based Disclosure, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 115, 132 (2009) (“It is no secret to 
corporations that producing enormous amounts of information in response to consumer and investor 
demands can undermine adequate understanding.  As one multi-national corporation recently re-
ported, ‘you can’t call it transparency if you simply spew information out into the marketplace, or 
unleash what is effectively a data dump on your customers.’”); see Rachel Emma Silverman, GE to 
Change Its Practices of Disclosure, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2002, at A3 (giving an example of how a 
company can have ineffective disclosure).  See generally Paredes, supra note 2. 
 161. See Susanna K. Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward 
a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 146–47 (2006) 
(“[D]isclosure that is too long or complex to be comprehensible to the average person floods the 
individual with too much nonessential data and overloads the person with information that inhibits 
optimal decision-making.”). 
 162. See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 5, at 1533–34 (discussing the substantive implications of 
presentation); Viscusi, supra note 86, at 630–36. 
 163. See Christopher P. Puto, The Framing of Buying Decisions, 14 J. CONSUMER RES. 301 
(1987) (documenting that buyers show strong framing effects because they base their price targets in 
large part on gain or loss framing; their willingness to take on risk varies greatly, depending on the 
experimental frame); see also Joseph N. Cappella & Kathleen Hall Jamieson, News Frames, Politi-
cal Cynicism, and Media Cynicism, 546 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 71, 75–82 (1996) 
(citing studies relating to framing effects). 
 164. Paredes, supra note 2, at 418 (“Relatively little attention is paid to how the information is 
used—namely, how investors and securities market professionals search and process information 
and make decisions based on the information the federal securities laws make available.  In short, if 
the users do not process information effectively, it is not clear what good mandating disclosure 
does.”). 
 165. See, e.g., THOMAS TULLIS & WILLIAM ALBERT, MEASURING THE USER EXPERIENCE 8–10 
(2008) (describing the value of comparative metrics for users).  See generally YOUNGME MOON, 
DIFFERENT: ESCAPING THE COMPETITIVE HERD (2010) (explaining the importance of comparative 
metrics as a means for product differentiation). 
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culated risk materializes compared to other risks.  This silence makes 
investing difficult for individuals to properly assess a firm’s risk profile, 
which often exaggerates cognitive implications that, in turn, lead inves-
tors to underestimate (or overestimate) a firm’s risk exposure.  Current 
risk-disclosure practices result in an enumeration of foreseeable risks 
without conveying the relative likelihood and impact of those risks.  The 
omission of likelihood and impact can artificially inflate (or deflate) a 
firm’s market capitalization, as investors cannot properly value the 
firm.166 
This inability to properly evaluate a firm and its risks has played it-
self out in recent years. For example, Bear Stearns included the follow-
ing Risk Factor in its 2007 annual report: “Liquidity risk could impair 
our ability to fund operations and jeopardize our financial condition.”167  
How likely was this impairment?  How serious was this impairment?  
Was this the type of impairment that could cause the firm to shut its 
doors?  (This impairment did occur in 2008 and, in fact, caused the fed-
eral government to force Bear Stearns to sell itself to J.P. Morgan.)168 
Similarly, Lehman Brothers stated in its 2007 Risk Factors section: 
 
To the extent that a liquidity event lasts for more than one year, or 
our expectations concerning the market conditions that exist during 
a liquidity event, or our access to funds, prove to be inaccurate . . . 
our ability to repay maturing indebtedness and fund operations 
could be significantly impaired.169 
 
Again, investors could have greatly benefited from a good-faith assess-
ment by Lehman Brothers of the likelihood and severity of this type of 
event.  In September 2008, this risk occurred in dramatic fashion: Leh-
man was forced to file for bankruptcy, and the financial system was 
pushed to the brink of collapse.170 
                                                 
 166. See S.P. Kothari et al., Do Managers Withhold Bad News? (Mass. Inst. of Tech., Sloan 
Sch. Mgmt., Working Paper No. 4556–05, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=803865 
(suggesting that “management, on average, delays the release of bad news to investors,” but imme-
diately releases good news). 
 167. Bear Stearns Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 17 (Jan. 29, 2008) [hereinafter 2007 
Bear Stearns Annual Report]. 
 168. See WILLIAM D. COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS: A TALE OF HUBRIS AND WRETCHED EXCESS 
ON WALL STREET 89–110 (2009) (chronicling the frantic purchase of Bear Stearns by J.P. Morgan 
with the support of the federal government). 
 169. Lehman Bros. Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 16 (Jan. 29, 2008) [hereinafter 2007 
Lehman Bros. Annual Report]. 
 170. Ben White & Jenny Anderson, A Frantic Weekend That Wall Street Won’t Forget, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at C1 (describing the weekend Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy and the 
resulting panic on Wall Street). 
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Merck, the giant pharmaceutical manufacturer, disclosed in the 
Risk Factors section of its 2009 annual report: 
 
Pharmaceutical products can develop unexpected safety or effi-
cacy concerns. 
Unexpected safety or efficacy concerns can arise with respect to 
marketed products, whether or not scientifically justified, leading 
to product recalls, withdrawals, or declining sales, as well as 
product liability, consumer fraud and/or other claims.171 
 
Given Merck’s troubles with the drug Vioxx, a painkiller that alle-
gedly posed an increased danger for heart attacks and strokes,172 inves-
tors could have benefited from a more detailed assessment of this type of 
risk.  For example, Merck could disclose whether one or more of its 
blockbuster drugs were specifically raising safety or efficacy concerns. 
Investors’ understandings of a firm’s risk exposure would be sub-
stantially enhanced if a firm were to assess and articulate its risk profile 
in terms of relative likelihood. 
Additionally, current risk-disclosure practices result in an enumera-
tion of foreseeable risks without articulating the relative severity of the 
impact if an articulated risk materializes.  Firms often couch the potential 
impact of a risk materializing with terms such as “material,” “signifi-
cant,” or “meaningful,” without fully explaining the consequences with 
greater specificity. For example: 
  
                                                 
 171. Merck & Co., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 30 (Mar. 1, 2010) [hereinafter 2009 
Merck Annual Report]. 
 172. See Alex Berenson, Plaintiffs Find Payday Elusive in Vioxx Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 
2007, at A1; Natasha Singer, Trial Puts Spotlight on Merck, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2009, at 
B1; Alex Berenson et al., Despite Warnings, Drug Giant Took Long Path to Vioxx Recall, N.Y. TIM
ES, Nov. 14, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/14/business/14merck.html. 
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We [Tesla Motors] began production of our Tesla Roadster only in 
2008, and our second planned vehicle, our Model S, is not expected 
to be in production until 2012, requires significant investment prior 
to commercial introduction, and may never be successfully devel-
oped or commercially successful.  There can be no assur-
ance . . . that our future models, including the Model S, will become 
commercially viable.173 
 
Our [Bear Stearns’s] businesses could be adversely affected by 
market fluctuations.  Our businesses are materially affected by con-
ditions in the financial markets and economic conditions generally, 
both in the U.S. and elsewhere.174 
 
Not all material risks have the same impact.  Although it is difficult to 
project the consequences of future events, firms are in the best position 
to analyze and articulate these risks with greater specificity. 
Absent enhanced Risk Factors, resource-constrained investors, with 
their cognitive limitations, try (without great success) to assess for them-
selves the likelihood and severity of various risks of public firms.175  
Given their resources and access to information, firms are often in a 
much better position than the investing public to make a good faith as-
sessment of the relative likelihood and severity of their risks.  Where a 
firm is unable to make a good faith assessment, it could simply inform 
investors that it is unable to do so, and such uncertainty can be priced 
into a firm’s valuation. 
C.  Opaque on Risk Dynamics 
The current Risk Factor framework is also opaque regarding 
changes to a firm’s risk exposure.  Firms generally update their Risk Fac-
tors on an annual basis, often replicating disclosures from the previous 
year without making any meaningful changes.  Yet, when changes occur, 
those changes are not readily apparent to investors.  Such changes are 
                                                 
 173. Tesla Motor, Inc., Initial Public Offering (Form S-1), at 19 (June 29, 2010) [hereinafter 
2009 Tesla Initial Public Offering] (emphasis added). 
 174. 2007 Bear Stearns Annual Report, supra note 167, at 2 (emphasis added). 
 175. See BARUCH FISCHHOFF ET AL., ACCEPTABLE RISK (1981) (finding that people overesti-
mate low-probability risks while they underestimate high-probability risks); Chris Guthrie, A New 
Social Scientific Assessment of Law and Human Behavior: Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and 
the Law, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1115, 1119 (2003) (“People ‘overweigh outcomes that are considered 
certain, relative to outcomes which are merely probable.’”) (quoting Kahneman & Tversky, supra 
note 100, at 265). 
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often a reflection of new information or new assessments of prior infor-
mation.  In either instance, changes are the result of meaningful recali-
brations of a firm’s risk exposure.  The failure to highlight these changes 
makes it harder for investors to examine the change in a firm’s risk expo-
sure.  Investors would only be aware of the new or changed disclosures if 
they manually compared one periodic filing to a prior version.  This 
process is incredibly cumbersome and performed by few investors. 
Moreover, the confirmation bias, the status quo bias, and the anc-
horing heuristic can make it difficult for investors to reassess a firm’s 
risk profile after previously having a favorable initial impression of a 
firm.176  Therefore, changes in a firm’s risk profile need to be highlighted 
so that they are more salient to the investor.177 
D.  Vague in Substance 
The SEC requires Risk Factors to be drafted in “plain English,”178 
but much of the disclosure in the public filings cannot be properly de-
scribed using the adjectives plain and English.179  Disclosures are overly 
general, vague in content, and lacking in meaningful detail for the read-
                                                 
 176. See Ripken, supra note 7, at 968 (“[T]he confirmation bias and the anchoring heuristic 
may lead investors who have already formed a favorable impression of a company to interpret man-
agers’ cautionary language in a manner that conforms to investors’ own previously held optimistic 
views.”). 
 177. See id. (“Risk Factor warnings that are not particularly salient or given primary considera-
tion may not enter into investors’ initial risk perceptions at all.”). 
 178. 503(c), supra note 4. 
 179. See McFarland, supra note 26, at 321–22 (“Plain English is particularly important as 
investors rely less on intermediaries to make their investment decisions. . . . Applying the Plain 
English rules to . . . disclosure would help alleviate the potential for investors to misunderstand the 
disclosure, or simply tune it out because of information overload.”); Ripken, supra note 161, at 186 
(“[D]isclosure documents today are written by corporate lawyers in formalized language to protect 
the corporation from liability rather than to provide the investor with meaningful information.  The 
document is, consequently, often presented in technical language and unreadable ‘legalese.’”) (quot-
ing Alan B. Levenson, The Role of the SEC as a Consumer Protection Agency, 27 BUS. LAW. 61, 68 
(1971) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 73–85, at 2 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. 
Mahar eds., 1973))); John Schwartz, Transparency, Lost in the Fog, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, at C1 
(discussing the lack of understandable disclosure regarding executive compensation). 
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er.180  These shortcomings result in disclosures that often fail to properly 
convey, with ample specificity, the gravity of a firm’s risks.181 
Vague risk disclosures can amplify and play into certain investors’ 
cognitive limitations.  The lack of specificity makes it more likely that 
existing investors of a firm interpret the disclosure to confirm their initial 
positive perceptions about a firm.182 
_____ 
The current risk-disclosure framework has serious shortcomings, 
many of which are exacerbated by the cognitive limitations of real inves-
tors.  The next Part addresses those shortcomings by proposing a beha-
vioral framework for securities risk disclosure. 
IV. A BEHAVIORAL FRAMEWORK: KEY ELEMENTS 
A.  A New Default 
Under the proposed framework, the SEC would amend existing 
rules to set a new default framework for Risk Factors.  This new frame-
work will work within the current disclosure apparatus to minimize 
                                                 
 180. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Cor-
porations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 
101, 106–09 (1997) (describing some of the problems with the current disclosure system); Alan R. 
Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 26 
(1999) (“[S]tudies indicate that even under mandatory constraints managers systematically avoid 
releasing unfavorable forecasts . . . .”).  See generally Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accu-
racy, and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331 (2003). 
 181. Consider the vagueness of the following examples from Bear Stearns and Lehman Broth-
ers, two firms that played roles in the recent financial crisis, and Eli Lilly and Company, a major 
pharmaceutical company: 
• “Our risk management policies and procedures may leave us exposed to unidentified or 
unanticipated risk.” 2007 Bear Stearns Annual Report, supra note 167, at 16. 
• “As a global investment bank, risk is an inherent part of our business. Our businesses 
are materially affected by conditions in the financial markets and economic conditions 
generally around the world.”  2007 Lehman Bros. Annual Report, supra note 169, at 13. 
• “We face many product liability claims today, and future claims will be largely self-
insured.  We are subject to a substantial number of product liability claims involving 
primarily Zyprexa, diethylstilbestrol (‘DES’), thimerosal, and Byetta, and because of 
the nature of pharmaceutical products, it is possible that we could become subject to 
large numbers of product liability claims for other products in the future.”  Eli Lilly & 
Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 13 (Feb. 22, 2010). 
 182. See Langevoort, supra note 42, at 639–40 (finding that investors who have previously 
made good investing decisions overvalue their successes based on a perceived level of skill that they 
possess); Philip E. Tetlock, Theory-Driven Reasoning About Plausible Pasts and Probable Futures 
in World Politics: Are We Prisoners of Our Preconceptions?, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 335 (1999) (show-
ing that individuals whose predictions wind up materializing tend to take credit for being right, and 
as a result, exude confidence in their abilities); Whyte et al., supra note 93 (showing that investors 
with a higher view of self-efficacy built upon past success irrationally escalate commitment). 
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adoption costs for public firms.  An important feature of the proposed 
framework is that firms will be able to opt out if they believe that the 
existing Risk Factor requirements are more appropriate for them.  Firms 
that opt out, however, would have to disclose why they are unable or 
unwilling to comply with the new, enhanced rules.183  This feature is a 
departure from the one-size-fits-all mandates of most securities regula-
tion.184  Companies in various industries and of various sophistication 
have different levels of certainty and knowledge concerning their risk 
exposure.  An emerging biotechnology firm with one potential marketa-
ble product may not have the same grasp of its risks as a bookseller like 
Barnes & Noble.  A path-breaking startup electric-car manufacturer may 
not have the same handle on its risks as the well-established Ford Motor 
Company.185 
Further, numerous behavioral studies suggest that defaults with opt-
out provisions tend to result in more compliance than defaults with opt-in 
provisions.186  These studies suggest that compliance by many firms may, 
in the long run, lead to a “race to the top,” leaving firms that opt out in 
the minority.187  This could cause harm to the reputations of firms who 
refuse to, or are unable to comply with, the new more investor-friendly 
risk-disclosure rules.188  Alternatively, the opt-out provision can serve as 
                                                 
 183. See Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC’s Regulatory 
Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 1026 (2006) (“The virtue of default rules 
is that they allow parties to contract around the law to order their affairs to fit their particular needs 
and preferences.  The ability to opt out also provides an important safety valve against the risk of 
overregulation.”). 
 184. See id. (“When the SEC chooses to regulate, instead of imposing mandatory one-size-fits-
all requirements as it almost always does, the Commission should increasingly consider default 
rules.”). 
 185. See, e.g., 2009 Tesla Initial Public Offering, supra note 173, at 13 (discussing the plethora 
of risks faced by a modern electric car company). 
 186. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN & THALER, supra note 87, at 35 (“In many contexts defaults have 
some extra nudging power because consumers may feel, rightly or wrongly, that default options 
come with an implicit endorsement from the default setter [the SEC].”); see also Steven Bellman et 
al., To Opt-In or Opt-Out? It Depends on the Question, 44 COMM. OF THE ACM 25 (2001) (finding 
that in regards to wireless-access point configuration, default settings dominated user behavior); Eric 
J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 SCI. 1338 (2003) (showing how de-
fault rules lead to wide compliance in the area of organ donation). 
 187. See Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 NW. 
U. L. REV. 655, 665 (2006) (“Higher compliance rates lead to a virtuous cycle.  Over time, the 
structurally preferred default behaviors give rise to accompanying social norms, further enforcing 
the desired conduct.”); see also Choi & Pritchard, supra note 70, at 44–46 (showing there will be a 
presumption of doing something that leads to compliance because the alternative is to drive investors 
away in the context of regulation). 
 188. See Cheng, supra note 187, at 665; see also Choi & Pritchard, supra note 70, at 44–46. 
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a pricing signal and risk indicator to investors about management’s grasp 
of a firm’s risks.189 
B.  New Risk Framing 
1.  A New Anchor 
Under the behavioral framework, Regulation S-K will be amended 
to make Risk Factors the “anchor.”  Risk Factors will be the first subs-
tantive item after the cover page or table of contents of any prospectus, 
quarterly report on Form 10-Q, or annual report on Form 10-K.  Taking 
into account the heuristic of “anchoring,” the Risk Factors190 will serve 
as an anchor in the minds of investors as they read a firm’s later rosier 
disclosures.191 
This new placement will also help confront the overoptimism bi-
as.192  Moreover, the new framework would require firms to restate in 
full their latest Risk Factors immediately after the cover page or table of 
contents when they incorporate their Risk Factors in a prospectus by ref-
erence to their annual and quarterly reports.  Restating this information 
allows it to be readily viewed.193  Absent this restatement, investors need 
to search for the Risk Factors in other filings, which discourages inves-
tors from becoming fully educated and leaves them with a more positive 
perception of a firm. 
2.  New Risk Taxonomy 
Whereas the current rules require only that Risk Factors “be concise 
and organized logically,” the new framework would specify how to ac-
complish this goal.  It would require Risk Factors to be organized in 
terms of relative likelihood and relative impact.194  The framework would 
                                                 
 189. See, e.g., Choi & Pritchard, supra note 70, at 3 (“[I]f companies do not give credible 
assurances that they will disclose truthfully the information that investors rely upon to value securi-
ties, those companies will pay substantial risk premia (thereby compensating investors for the risk of 
fraud) or be unable to sell their securities altogether.”). 
 190. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
 191. See also Ripken, supra note 7, at 986 (“Cautionary language that is sufficient in form and 
content to catch the market’s attention, maintain that attention, and turn it toward a serious consider-
ation of the risks provides a much-needed check on the market’s collective inclination to accept 
overly rosy forward-looking information.”).  See generally Henson, supra note 7; Frensch, supra 
note 7. 
 192. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
 193. See Hoffman, supra note 87, at 557 (according to behavioral law and economics research, 
“new information is processed against the background of what came before”). 
 194. 503(c), supra note 4. 
2011] A Behavioral Framework for Securities Risk 359 
be based on three tiers for each metric.195  It would offer the investing 
public a more comprehensible form of disclosure by disclosing risks in a 
more salient, menu-like framework with accessible comparative me-
trics.196 
Relative likelihood would be categorized based on levels corres-
ponding to each risk’s probable occurrence: Level A: Very Likely, Level 
B: Likely, and Level C: Unlikely.  This type of classification is similar to 
that used by meteorologists to measure typhoon conditions of readiness, 
where “Condition 1” indicates that destructive winds are probable within 
twelve hours, and each additional level indicates a longer period of time 
until impact.197 
Relative impact would be categorized based on the relative serious-
ness of the consequences should an articulated risk materialize.  A Cate-
gory 1 risk, for example, would be a risk that would have a significant 
effect on the firm if it were to materialize; a Category 2 risk would have a 
material effect on the firm; and a Category 3 risk would have a cata-
strophic effect on the firm.  This type of classification is akin to the clas-
sification used by meteorologists to warn people about a hurricane’s in-
tensity, where a Category 1 hurricane is expected to have damaging 
winds and a Category 5 hurricane is expected to cause catastrophic dam-
age.198 
For example, under the current framework, a risk factor would be 
entitled “Credit Risk.”  Under the behavioral framework, the same factor 
would be entitled “A1—Credit Risk.”  This designation means that the 
credit risk is very likely to occur and will have a significant effect on the 
firm. 
                                                 
 195. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988) (quoting S.E.C. v. Tex. Gulf Sul-
phur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (“[M]ateriality ‘will depend at any given time upon a 
balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of 
the event in light of the totality of the company activity.’”)); United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 
159 F.2d 169, 173–74 (2d Cir. 1947). 
 196. Many state securities regulators already require Risk Factors for small companies that use 
the Small Co. Offering Registration Form (Form U-7) to “[l]ist in the order of importance the 
factors that the Company considers to be the most significant risks to an investor.” See SMALL CO. 
OFFERINGS REGISTRATION FORM (FORM U-7), NASAA Rep. (CCH) P 5057, at 5197 (Dec. 1999); 
Hanson & Kysar, supra note 9, at 635 (“[W]e believe that market outcomes frequently will be heavi-
ly influenced, if not determined, by the ability of one actor to control the format of information, the 
presentation of choices, and, in general, the setting within which market transactions occur.”). See 
generally Tversky & Fox, supra note 9; Tykocinski et al., supra note 9. 
 197. See Dave Puckett, Responder’s Forum: Typhoon Conditions War-
rant Preparation (Apr. 13, 2005), http://www.navy.mil/search/displaybbs.asp?bbs_id=1326 (defin-
ing the Tropical Cyclone Conditions of Readiness). 
 198. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NAT’L WEATHER SERV., NAT’L HURRICANE 
CTR., THE SAFFIR–SIMPSON HURRICANE SCALE, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutsshs.shtml (last 
modified Feb. 17, 2010). 
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Below is an illustration that compares Risk Factors under the exist-
ing and behavioral frameworks: 
 
Existing Framework Behavioral Framework 
Credit Risk 
_______________________ 
_______________________ 
Key Persons Risk 
_______________________ 
_______________________ 
Counterparty Risk 
________________________ 
________________________ 
A1—Credit Risk 
_______________________ 
_______________________ 
B1—Counterparty Risk 
_______________________ 
_______________________ 
C3—Key Persons Risk 
_______________________ 
_______________________ 
 
The new framework makes Risk Factors more meaningful to the 
investing public in three ways.  First, investors can readily see which 
risks are most likely to occur and are most serious.  Many studies have 
suggested that people have difficulty assessing probability and impact.199  
Therefore, disclosures that state the firm’s assessments increase the mea-
ningfulness of the disclosures. 
Second, the behavioral framework allows investors to better cali-
brate their investment calculus.  For example, an investor is interested in 
buying stock in Firm A because of its high credit ratings and senior man-
agement.  That investor would be able to assess the likelihood and se-
riousness of risks regarding those key issues of concern, thereby allow-
ing the investor to make a more informed investment decision. 
Third, the behavioral framework allows investors to better compare 
the risk profiles of similar firms.  For example, if an investor is debating 
between investing in Bank A or Bank B, that investor can readily com-
pare the risk profiles of both banks before making an investment deci-
sion.  The tiered, menu-like format creates inherent, accessible compara-
tive metrics for investors.  Additionally, recent developments at the SEC 
regarding disclosures are similarly driven towards giving ordinary inves-
tors enhanced information.200 
                                                 
 199. See, e.g., Guthrie, supra note 175; FISCHHOFF ET AL., supra note 175 (finding that people 
overestimate low probability risks while underestimate high probability risks).  See generally 
Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 100. 
 200. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., 21ST CENTURY DISCLOSURE INITIATIVE, TOWARD 
GREATER TRANSPARENCY: MODERNIZING THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION’S 
DISCLOSURE SYSTEM 3 (2009), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/disclosureinitiative/report.pdf [herei-
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Although this new risk taxonomy may appear similar to the much-
maligned credit ratings of the recent financial crisis, significant differ-
ences exist.201  Unlike ratings agencies that generate ratings using model-
ing that is based on limited information samples provided by firms,202 the 
proposed rankings will be conducted by the firms themselves, using all 
of the information available to them.  Therefore firms would not be able 
to “shop” for better risk rankings like they do with credit ratings.203  A 
serious onus would also be on the firm to generate accurate risk rankings 
so as to avoid liability-generating defective disclosures and financially 
consequential reputational harms.204 
Admittedly, forecasting uncertain future events is difficult, but 
firms are in a better position than most investors to assess the probabili-
ties and seriousness of the firms’ articulated risks.  Many public firms 
already make such risk assessments internally.205  If a firm is unable to 
                                                                                                             
nafter DISCLOSURE INITIATIVE] (“Modernizing the disclosure system [is geared towards improving] 
transparency by making disclosure information more accessible and easier to use.”). 
 201. See MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT 98 (2010) (“Like pretty much everything else that 
was happening between subprime mortgage borrowers and lenders, it followed from the defects of 
the models used to evaluate subprime mortgage bonds by the two major rating agencies, Moody’s 
and Standard & Poor’s.”); ROGER LOWENSTEIN, THE END OF WALL STREET 39–46 (2010) (criti-
quing the role of the credit rating agencies in the recent financial crisis); Gretchen Morgenson & 
Louise Story, Rating Agency Data Aided Wall Street in Deals, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/business/24rating.ht
ml?_r=1&emc=eta1 (“But by routinely sharing their models, the agencies in effect gave bankers the  
tools to tinker with their complicated mortgage deals until the models produced the desired rat-
ings.”); Frank Partnoy, Overdependence on Credit Ratings was a Primary Cause of 
the Crisis (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Working Paper No. 288, 2009), available at http://www.b
epress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1299&context=feem. 
 202. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 201; Morgenson & Story, supra note 201 (critiquing the 
sampling-based model of rating agencies). 
 203. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 201, at 40–41 (commenting on the pay-to-rate business 
model of ratings agencies); Louise Story, Prosecutors Ask if 8 Banks Duped Rating Agencies, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 13, 2010, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/business/13street.html (“The New York attorney general has 
started an investigation of eight banks to determine whether they provided misleading information to 
rating agencies in order to inflate the grades of certain mortgage securities.”). 
 204. Admittedly, the lack of rating-agency-like conflicts in the proposed risk rankings does not 
mean a complete absence of conflicts.  Firms may be conflicted by different motivations in ranking 
and disclosing risks, but generally such conflicts already exist in terms of securities disclosures. 
 205. Many firms forecast with great accuracy on quarterly and annual earnings and other fi-
nancial metrics for the marketplace.  So, if their crystal balls can work for potential good news, then 
those same crystal balls should work for potential bad news.  See John S. Poole, Management Fore-
casts: Do They Have a Future in Corporate Takeovers?, 42 SW. L.J. 765, 803 (1988) (arguing that 
management forecasts are more accurate, empirically, than analyst forecasts); see also Curt Cutting, 
Turning Point for Rule 10b-5: Will Congressional Reforms Protect Small Corporations?, 56 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 555, 571 (1995) (noting that the “reticence to issue forward-looking statements undermines 
the adequacy and accuracy of corporate disclosure.”); Ripken, supra note 7, at 986 (“[C]orporate 
managers . . . should view meaningful risk disclosure as an opportunity to encourage . . . deliberation 
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make such projections, it should say so.  Then, investors can properly 
“price” that information into a firm’s valuation.206 
C.  Highlighting Risk Dynamics 
1. Highlighting Changes & Omissions 
The current Risk Factors framework fails to highlight the changes 
in a firm’s risk exposures.  In reading a firm’s Risk Factors from quarter 
to quarter, from year to year, an investor cannot readily discern changes 
in a firm’s Risk Factors.  For example, the online computer merchant, 
Dell Inc., included new language, underlined below, in its 2007 Annual 
Report.  Dell Inc. added the new language to an existing Risk Factor to 
reflect important changes in the company’s risk profile related to laptop 
battery shortages: 
 
Because we maintain minimal levels of component and product 
inventories a disruption in component or product availability such 
as the current industry shortage of laptop batteries could harm our 
financial performance and our ability to satisfy customer needs.207 
 
Under the current regulations, investors reading the annual report would 
likely miss the new language about the material concerns relating to lap-
top-battery shortages. 
Under the proposed framework, Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K, 
would be amended to require firms to highlight changes in Risk Factors 
by underlining the caption of disclosures with new language or omissions 
to call attention to those changed or new risk assessments. 
This simple change lowers the information costs and leads to a bet-
ter framing effect by calling attention to new and changed risks.  A li-
mited number of sophisticated investors at hedge funds and investment 
banks already have tools to highlight these changes, so the behavioral 
                                                                                                             
from investors who must confront the fact that there may be very good reasons not to purchase the 
shares of a company, notwithstanding its favorable predictions for the future.”). 
 206. For example, Merck’s Risk Factors state an inability to forecast certain legal liabilities.  
See 2009 Merck Annual Report, supra note 171, at 27 (“[Merck] is not currently able to estimate any 
additional amounts that it may be required to pay in connection with the Vioxx Lawsuits or Vioxx 
Investigations.  These proceedings are still expected to continue for years and the Company cannot 
predict the course the proceedings will take.  In view of the inherent difficulty of predicting the 
outcome of litigation, particularly where there are many claimants and the claimants seek unspeci-
fied damages, the Company is unable to predict the outcome of these matters, and at this time cannot 
reasonably estimate the possible loss or range of loss with respect to the Vioxx Lawsuits.”). 
 207. 2007 Dell Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 12–13 (Mar. 31, 2008) (emphasis added). 
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framework essentially democratizes this critical information for all inves-
tors.208 
2. Executive Risk Attestations 
Similar to highlighting changes in Risk Factors, the behavioral 
framework would amend the chief executive officer’s certification.  Pur-
suant to Rules 13a-14(a) and 15d-14(a) of the Exchange Act, the chief 
executive officer’s certification is attached as an exhibit to a firm’s quar-
terly and annual reports.209  The behavioral framework would require the 
following language to be inserted into the certificate for attestation: 
“Based on my knowledge, the Risk Factors, and other risk-related infor-
mation included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the 
risk profile of the registrant as of this report.” 
This language is substantially similar to, and based on, existing lan-
guage in the certification concerning the disclosures and the financial 
information contained in a quarterly or annual report for a public firm, so 
it should not be unduly cumbersome.  In effect, this additional provision 
in the certificate, which senior executives personally attest to, will serve 
as a critical reminder for a firm’s highest officers to monitor the staleness 
(or freshness) of their Risk Factors for investors.210 
_____ 
The behavioral framework for securities risk disclosure is a practic-
able way of enhancing information for investors and improving risk 
management for firms.  The next Part explores some key implications of 
the behavioral framework. 
V. KEY IMPLICATIONS 
The behavioral framework has a number of profound implications, 
five of which are discussed here.  The behavioral framework would 
(1) lead to a better capture of securities disclosure; (2) create a more ba-
lanced appeal to the underlying rationales for Risk Factors; (3) simplify 
                                                 
 208. See Zweig, supra note 112 (reporting on tools used by hedge funds to combat confirma-
tion bias). 
 209. 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(31) (2009) (Regulation S-K). 
 210. See Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack Corporate Gover-
nance: How Wise is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843, 1901 (2007) (“Clearly, today a 
strong empirical case indicates that section 302 certifications not only warn CEOs and CFOs to take 
their responsibilities seriously, but also provide valuable information to the capital markets.”); see 
also Paul A. Griffin & David H. Lont, Taking the Oath: Investor Response to SEC Certification 
Under Sarbanes-Oxley, 1 J. CONTEMP. ACCT. & ECON. 27 (2005) (“[I]nvestors d[o], in fact, respond 
to the events associated with SEC certification.”). 
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transparency and increase financial literacy; (4) lower information costs 
for investors by requiring companies to enhance their publicly available 
risk disclosures; and (5) improve financial arbitrage. 
A.  A Better Capture of Securities Disclosure 
In recent years, many financial regulations concerning securities 
risk have often taken on the form of statutory prohibitions and penalties 
and overlooked disclosure as a powerful, complementary regulatory 
tool.211  Worried about ordinary investors partaking in risky private unre-
gistered offerings?  Pass a rule banning ordinary investors from investing 
in such offerings.212  Concerned about stock-option granting practices?  
Levy large penalties on the offending parties.213  While prohibitions and 
penalties are more satisfying politically and can have some deterrent ef-
fect, they are—standing alone—flawed and ineffective approaches to 
risk regulation.214 
After the economic crisis, many politicians, regulators, investor ad-
vocates, and some regulated entities called for corrective mechanisms to 
fix risk-management vulnerabilities that the recent crisis exposed.215  
Many post-crisis proposals and actions are solely in the form of en-
hanced penalties for financial misconduct and additional enforcement 
tools to deter potential bad acts.216  These “sell-side” regulations include 
                                                 
 211. See, e.g., Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 906, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
(116 Stat.) 743 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1350(a)–(b)); Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate Regulatory 
Schemes for Parallel Activities: Securities Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling, and In-
surance, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 375, 384 (2005) (“In the first instance, the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act provides heightened criminal penalties for securities law violations.”). 
 212. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2009). 
 213. See generally NIXON PEABODY, THE STOCK OPTIONS PROBE: CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND AUDIT COMMITTEE, May 25, 
2006, available at http://www.nixonpeabody.com/publications_detail3.asp?ID=1381; 
Perfect Payday: Options Scorecard, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-optionsscore06-full.html (last modified Sept. 
4, 2007); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Settles Options Backdating Case Against 
Ryan Ashley Brant, Former Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of Take-Two Inter-
active Software, Inc. (Feb. 14, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20003.htm; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, SEC Files Actions Against Former CFO and Former Controller of Engineered Support 
Systems, Inc. Relating to Options Backdating Scheme (Feb. 6, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr19990.htm. 
 214.  See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 5, at 1510–17 (critiquing the ineffectiveness of bans on 
market transactions). 
 215. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 1; Wyatt & Herszenhorn, supra note 1. 
 216. See John C. Coates IV, The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, 21 J. ECON. 
PERS. 91, 110 (2007) (“The Sarbanes–Oxley legislation increased maximum criminal sentences for 
fraud, consistent with Congress’s penchant over the last 50 years to criminalize more conduct and 
increase criminal penalties.”); Ripken, supra note 161, at 142–43 (discussing new bans and penalties 
in the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002); see also 148 CONG. REC. S6516, 6524–25 (daily ed. July 10, 
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litigation and investigations from state attorneys general,217 legislation 
aimed at clawing back and curbing compensation in the industry,218 and 
proposals for new regulatory agencies and additional powers for existing 
regulators.219 
While these regulations can have a meaningful impact on the finan-
cial industry, they are, at best, a half measure because they fail to ade-
quately address the risk vulnerabilities of the purchasing actor or the sys-
tem at large.220  Every transaction has two sides.  For every defaulted 
subprime mortgage, there is, perhaps, an unscrupulously aggressive 
mortgage lender, but also an uninformed, overly optimistic homeown-
er.221  For every failed publicly traded bank, not only are there highly 
                                                                                                             
2002) (statement of Sen. Wellstone) (“This bill . . . holds bad actors accountable for their fraud and 
deception.”); Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, President Bush Signs Corporate 
Corruption Bill (July 30, 2002), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020730.html. 
 217. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT MEASURES RELATED TO THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS (2010), available at http://fcic.gov/reports/pdfs/2010–0114–
EnforcementMeasures.pdf (highlighting the various enforcement actions taken by state attorneys 
general); Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street in Turmoil: Who is Protecting the Investor?: State–
Federal Relations Post-Eliot Spitzer, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 117, 118 (2004) (“[Eliot] Spitzer, the 
most successful of what might best be described as an emerging generation of ‘Enronian Policy 
Entrepreneurs,’ saw the collapse of Enron as opening what political scientists describe as a ‘policy 
window’—a window in time during which the political environment is unusually welcoming of new 
regulations and policy proposals.”); Paredes, supra note 2, at 429 (“[S]tate attorneys general, most 
notably New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, have been active to an unprecedented degree in 
bringing or threatening charges for fraud or corporate corruption against corporate executives, finan-
cial firms on Wall Street, and securities market professionals.”). 
 218. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION 
12 (2009), http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf [hereinafter FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY REFORM] (“Federal regulators should issue standards and guidelines to better align 
executive compensation practices of financial firms with long-term shareholder value and to prevent 
compensation practices from providing incentives that could threaten the safety and soundness of 
supervised institutions.”); Andrea Fuller, 
House Approves Limits on Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/01/business/01pay.html (describing legislation aimed at reducing 
executive pay); Stephen Labaton, U.S. to Order Pay Cuts at Firms That Got Most Aid, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 21, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/22/business/22pay.html (describing efforts to re-
duce compensation at companies that received government assistance). 
 219. See generally FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 218. 
 220. See Richard A. Posner, Op-Ed., Treating Financial Consumers as Consenting Adults, 
WALL ST. J., July 22, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203946904574302213
213148166.html (opining that consumers must bear some responsibility for their financial choices). 
 221. See John Carney, 20 Year Old Buys Home With $183,000 FHA Loan And Just 3.5% 
Down, BUS. INSIDER, Oct. 18, 2009 (giving an example of an overly optimistic homeowner); Bianna 
Golodryga, Do Homeowners Share Blame for Mortgage Mess?, ABC NEWS, Oct. 7, 2008, 
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/SmartHome/story?id=5973820 (“More Americans than ever have 
become first-time homeowners in the last decade.  It’s become increasingly clear, however, that 
many of them couldn’t keep up with home payments.”); Posner, supra note 220 (“It cannot just be 
assumed that most people who during the housing boom bought homes with adjustable-rate mort-
gages, or mortgages with prepayment penalties, or mortgages that required a low or even no down 
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aggressive executives, but also millions of investors who were ignorant 
of the risks inherent in their investments.  Therefore, in addition to en-
hanced sell-side regulation, improved buy-side regulation is also needed 
to better protect investors. 
A more effective regulatory approach is one that could supplement 
the enforcement paradigm with an enhanced disclosure framework based 
on what I term an “informational theory of regulation.”222  The theory, in 
this context, focuses on enhancing information for investors and other 
buy-side actors in order to allow them to maintain their sovereignty and 
make better decisions.223  A behavioral-framework approach to risk dis-
closure is one such approach that can lead to a better capture of the utility 
of disclosure. 
1.  Increased Effectiveness 
A behavioral framework for risk disclosure, while not fail-safe, has 
inherent advantages over a purely enforcement-based approach.224  First, 
a structural, disclosure-based approach lowers monitoring costs in a 
world where securities regulators, such as the SEC, have serious resource 
constraints.225  A purely enforcement-based approach would require con-
stant monitoring, policing, and punishment, which is impractical and in-
effective in the face of limited resources.  Moreover, underenforcement 
                                                                                                             
payment, were fools or victims of fraud.”); Ruth Simon & James R. Hagerty, One in Four Borrow-
ers is Underwater, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125903489722661849.html (“The proportion of U.S. homeowners 
who owe more on their mortgages than the properties are worth has swelled to about 23%, threaten-
ing prospects for a sustained housing recovery.”). 
 222. An “informational theory of regulation and law,” as I have termed it, departs from histori-
cal conceptions of the law, which were often rooted in power relations, social justice, control, and 
command.  While those conceptions have been constructive, our understanding of the law can be 
expanded through an information-based conception—a view of the law as a source of information 
aggregation and information enhancement towards better policies and choices.  The shift to this new 
theory would work in conjunction with, while not actually replacing, existing legal theories.  As 
initially conceptualized, an information theory of law would favor transparency over secrecy, colla-
boration over control, and incentives over mandates. 
 223. See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Op-Ed., Disclosure Is the Best Kind Of 
Credit Regulation, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2008, at A17 (advocating for transparency and electronic 
disclosure as the superior mode of credit regulation). 
 224. See generally Louis Lowenstein, Corporate Governance and the Voice of the Paparazzi 
(Columbia Law Sch., Working Paper No. 132, 1999), available 
at http://www.law.columbia.edu/null/Working+Paper+No?exclusive=filemgr.download&file_id=64
160&showthumb=0. 
 225. See Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at The SEC Speaks in 
2009 (Feb. 6, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch020609tap.htm (“[A]s 
an agency, the SEC has limited resources. Even if the agency’s budget increases, we still will be 
faced with the challenge of allocating a finite number of people and funds. It is critical to recognize 
that there is an opportunity cost when we dedicate resources to administer particular regulations, 
undertake certain examinations and inspections, and pursue specific enforcement actions.”). 
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would likely lead to ad hoc, dilutive compliance.226  The inability of the 
SEC to regularly review and monitor existing Risk Factors has resulted 
in disclosures of varying forms and utility for investors under the current 
framework.227  In contrast, a structural approach would push firms to 
make more meaningful disclosures by configuring the rules to require 
more substantive disclosures, and making vague disclosures undesirable 
and troublesome.228 
As an example of the advantages of a structural approach over an 
enforcement-based approach, consider the collection of federal income 
tax.  Federal law requires that income taxes for wages be withheld from 
the earner at the source of payment, rather than having a self-reporting, 
self-paying system that would require constant monitoring and collection 
by a resource-constrained Internal Revenue Service.229  Non-compliance 
with the current structural-based system is less likely because it requires 
affirmative fraudulent actions by the wage payer and payee.  The struc-
tural-regulatory approach of withholding is widely considered to be a 
great success in law.230 
Second, a structural, disclosure-based approach would lead to in-
creased effectiveness because once a regulatory apparatus geared to-
wards the desired outcome is constructed, that apparatus would be self-
executing.  The proposed framework will set a new default for public 
firms, which will likely lead to wide compliance.231  Wide compliance, in 
turn, will lead to a “virtuous cycle” of more compliance by other public 
firms and private firms going public.232  Wide compliance will also result 
in the positive externality of more uniformity in risk disclosures, which 
                                                 
 226. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 
169 (1968) (highlighting how sporadic enforcement dilutes the deterrent effect of law). 
 227. See Cheng, supra note 187, at 660 (“Underenforced laws create what might be (adventu-
rously) called ‘vagueness in practice.’”). 
 228. See supra Part IV for a more detailed discussion regarding the specific mechanisms under 
the proposed behavioral framework. 
 229. See 26 U.S.C. § 3402 (2006). 
 230. See Cheng, supra note 187, at 677 (“The use of structure to encourage tax compliance has 
been an unqualified success.”); Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties 
Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 698 (2007). 
 231. See SUNSTEIN & THALER, supra note 87, at 35 (“The combination of loss aversion and 
mindless choosing implies that if an option is designated as the ‘default,’ it will attract a large market 
share.  Default options act as powerful nudges.”); see also Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do 
Defaults Save Lives?, 302 SCI. 1338 (2003) (showing how default rules lead to wide compliance in 
the area of organ donation). 
 232. See Cheng, supra note 187, at 665 (“Higher compliance rates lead to a virtuous cycle. 
Over time, the structurally preferred default behaviors give rise to accompanying social norms, fur-
ther enforcing the desired conduct.”). 
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will lend itself to easier “comparison shopping,” as uniformity will create 
inherent comparative metrics for investors.233 
2. Increased Market Confidence 
Enhanced Risk Factors can lead to increased market confidence.234  
The recent financial crisis has eroded the public’s trust in the market and 
the market regulators.235  Trust is a crucial component to success of indi-
vidual firms and the economy at large.236  Enhanced Risk Factors create a 
greater sense of fairness for investors, both procedurally and expressive-
ly, which will likely help restore and increase market confidence. 
On a procedural level, the behavioral framework creates a greater 
sense of procedural justice, the idea that fairness in processes engenders 
greater faith in those processes.237  The new framework will signal inves-
tors that market regulators heard investors’ calls for better protections 
and are responding to their desires, which will generate more confidence 
in the system.238  Additionally, the behavioral framework gives notice to 
investors of the risks of their investments.  Notice is an important part of 
procedural justice.239  Both the signaling and notice effects of better dis-
                                                 
 233. See, e.g., THOMAS TULLIS & WILLIAM ALBERT, MEASURING THE USER EXPERIENCE 8–10 
(2008) (describing the value of comparative metrics for users).  See generally YOUNGME MOON, 
DIFFERENT: ESCAPING THE COMPETITIVE HERD (2010) (explicating the importance of comparative 
metrics as a means for product differentiation). 
 234. See EASTERBROOK & FISHEL, supra note 37, at 692 (“The justification most commonly 
offered for mandatory disclosure rules is that they are necessary to ‘preserve confidence’ in the 
capital markets . . . . Disclosure rules both deter fraud and equalize ‘access’ to information, restoring 
the necessary confidence.”); Ripken, supra note 161, at 155 (“Investor trust is therefore critical for 
the securities markets to work, and disclosure helps to facilitate that trust.”). 
 235. See Robert J. Shiller, Animal Spirits Depend on Trust, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2009, at A15, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123302080925418107.html (“The trust in the innovative 
lending practices was excessive; now that trust is replaced by deep mistrust.”). 
 236. See ARIELY, supra note 70, at 195–230 (discussing the importance of honesty and trust in 
economic transactions); ANNA BERNASEK, THE ECONOMICS OF INTEGRITY (2009) (discussing the 
critical role of integrity in the success and failure of company and states); Thorold Barker, Wall 
Street’s Trust Busters, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2009, at C10 (“But beyond the power struggles, huge 
losses and increased regulation, there is a more fundamental threat to the industry: the destruction of 
trust.”); Philippe Aghion et al.,  Regulation and Distrust (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 14,648, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14648; Laura Bottazzi et al., 
The Importance of Trust for Investment: Evidence from Venture Capital (Innocenzo Gasparini Inst. 
for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 325, 2010), available at ftp://ftp.igier.uni–
bocconi.it/wp/2007/325.pdf (“[W]e find a positive effect of trust on investments.”). 
 237. See generally Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF 
JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 65 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2000). 
 238. See Tom R. Tyler & Hulda Thorisdottir, A Psychological Perspective on Compensation 
for Harm: Examining the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 355, 
380–82 (2003) (finding that when people get to state their case to an authority, they are more likely 
to accept the decision that the authority makes than when their opinions are not taken into account). 
 239. See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 305 (2004) (high-
lighting notice as a principle of procedural justice); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 
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closures will likely result in a greater sense of procedural justice for in-
vestors leading to more trust in the marketplace.240  Mechanisms that are 
procedurally more just engender greater confidence in those mechan-
isms.241 
A greater sense of procedural justice may reduce the success rates 
of meritless private litigation against public firms.  Evidence from the 
medical malpractice and tort contexts suggests that a greater sense of 
procedural justice can reduce litigation.242 
On an expressive level, the rulemaking process of creating the be-
havioral framework can also increase confidence and change norms in 
the marketplace.  The rulemaking process would aggregate information 
about improving Risk Factors and bring greater focus to the benefits of 
the behavioral framework, which would generally create additional con-
fidence in risk disclosures.243  Furthermore, the behavioral framework 
would better inform investors about the risks of public firms, thereby 
changing their attitudes about the utility of risk disclosure and the trust-
                                                                                                             
(1976) (finding that due process requires that when a person is in serious jeopardy of serious loss, he 
should be given notice of the case against him and an opportunity to respond); Eash v. Riggins 
Trucking Co., 757 F.2d 557, 579 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he principles 
of procedural fairness embedded in the Constitution . . . require adversary proceedings including 
notice.”); Am. Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1244 (3d Cir. 1975) (“One of 
the basic tenets of American jurisprudence is that procedural fairness requires that each party have 
notice of the issues involved and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaning-
ful manner.”). 
 240. See Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 238, at 380–83 (showing that people whose views 
are considered in the decision making process will emerge from the process with a belief that the 
process was fair). See generally JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (Lawrence Erlbaum Assocs. 1975); Tyler & Lind, supra note 237, at 65. 
 241. See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL 
JUSTICE (Plenum Press 1988); THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 240; Edith Barrett-Howard & Tom 
R. Tyler, Procedural Justice as a Criterion in Allocation Decisions, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 296, 300 (1986); Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: 
Implications for Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433 (1992). 
 242. See, e.g., Rick Boothman, Apologies and a Strong Defense at the University of Michigan 
Health System, 32 PHYSICIAN EXEC. 7, 10 (2006) (showing how a doctor’s honesty with a patient 
can reduce a patient’s willingness to litigate); Steve S. Kraman & Ginny Hamm, Risk Management: 
Extreme Honesty May Be the Best Policy, 131 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 963 (1999) (showing 
how a doctor’s honesty with a patient can lead to a lower chance of litigation); E. Allan Lind et al., 
In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants’ Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice 
System, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 953, 967–68 (1990) (showing the effect of procedural justice on the 
filing of lawsuits); Liz Kowalczyk, Hospitals Study When to Apologize to Patients, BOSTON GLOBE, 
June 24, 2005, at A1 (“[T]here . . . is growing belief among malpractice insurers that . . . disclosure 
and open expression of sympathy and remorse could head off malpractice lawsuits in a system reel-
ing from skyrocketing premiums.”). 
 243. See generally Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. 
REV. 1649 (2000). 
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worthiness of the disclosing firms.244  This change would lead to a great-
er collective confidence in the marketplace.245  This expectation is con-
sistent with market studies suggesting that “companies voluntarily dis-
closing more in their annual reports than is required may command a 
higher stock price.”246 
B. A More Balanced Appeal to Underlying Rationales 
In Part I, I articulated three underlying rationales for Risk Factors: 
information, compliance, and litigation avoidance.247  Given the evolu-
tion of securities litigation and regulation, much of the current risk-
disclosure practice appears to be driven by the litigation-avoidance and 
compliance rationales.248  Due to the expensive nature and proliferation 
of securities litigation, firms and their attorneys often imagine plaintiffs’ 
lawyers as their intended readers in drafting Risk Factors.249  As a result, 
disclosures are obfuscated and muddled with overly large qualifiers and 
legalese despite requirements for “plain English.”250  This heavy empha-
sis on the litigation-avoidance and compliance rationales comes at the 
expense of the information rationale.  This leads to a disclosure regime 
that is technically compliant with the rules but unfaithful to the SEC’s 
historical, core principle of receiving high-quality information to protect 
investors.251 
The proposed framework leads to a more balanced approach to the 
underlying, cross-cutting rationales and shifts emphasis back to the in-
formation rationale.  Classifying risks based on relative likelihood and 
relative impact creates a more accessible presentation format that allows 
readers to better understand the information.  The new framework could 
                                                 
 244. See generally Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. 
REV. 339 (2000); McAdams, supra note 243 (suggesting that the expressive function of law can lead 
to more cooperation). 
 245. See generally McAdams, supra note 244; McAdams, supra note 243. 
 246. Meet S&P’s Corporate–Disclosure Rankings, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Oct. 15, 2002, 
http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/oct2002/pi20021015_6208.htm. 
 247. See supra Part I.B. 
 248. See Siebecker, supra note 160, at 132 (“Why would corporations engage in a ‘data dump’ 
that impedes understanding?  The securities regulation regime that governs mandatory reporting of 
public companies, as well as most state corporate laws, provide significant immunity from fraud 
liability for comprehensive disclosure, even if the amount of disclosure arguably renders adequate 
understanding all but impossible.”). 
 249. See Ripken, supra note 161, at 186 (“[D]isclosure documents today are written by corpo-
rate lawyers in formalized language to protect the corporation from liability rather than to provide 
the investor with meaningful information.”). 
 250. See generally Ripken, supra note 161, at 186 (“[D]isclosure documents [are] ‘often pre-
sented in technical language and unreadable ‘legalese.’”); Schwartz, supra note 179 (discussing the 
lack of understandable disclosure regarding executive compensation). 
 251. See Siebecker, supra note 160. 
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also lead to a shift in a firm’s perspective when drafting disclosures.  
Firms under the new framework would have to consider their risks more 
carefully because they would have to rank their vulnerabilities.  This 
ranking would shift the drafting posture from a litigation-avoidance 
posture to an informational posture, thereby creating disclosure that is 
more meaningful to the investor.  Disclosure then becomes more than a 
regulatory chore to be completed; it becomes a meaningful risk-
management tool for firms.252  Additionally, this disclosure may also lead 
managers to rethink or avoid actions that will generate highly negative 
disclosures or riskier classifications.253  If done appropriately, the beha-
vioral framework can lead to better information for investors and better 
risk management for firms.254 
C.  Simplified Transparency & Financial Literacy 
The behavioral framework can lead towards more simplified trans-
parency that increases financial literacy and readership of securities fil-
ings.  For much of the SEC’s history, regulatory emphasis has been 
placed on more disclosure rather than better disclosure.255  That focus, 
perhaps, has been unduly tied to quantity rather than quality.256  In this 
instance, Hebert Simon may have said it best: “A wealth of information 
creates a poverty of attention.”257  As a result, a popular perception (or 
misperception) exists that all securities disclosure is incomprehensible 
and unhelpful.258  Many investors cannot understand the disclosed infor-
                                                 
 252. See Fox, supra note 11, at 123 (“When managers have the legal obligation to disclose 
certain information, they may have to gather and analyze information they would otherwise ig-
nore.”). 
 253. See id. at 125 (“Required disclosure, therefore, will make [management] try harder to 
avoid actions that will generate negative information.”). 
 254. See Cary, supra note 13, at 410–11; Schmidt, supra note 13, at 91–92 (“[R]isk manage-
ment framework can improve the transparency of disclosures to help investors and customers better 
understand the operations of the firm . . . . [E]ach entity should disclose the information its stake-
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Lowenstein, supra note 13; Pinto, supra note 13. 
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 256. See JONATHON BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 260, 272 (3d ed. 2000) (suggesting that 
more information does not necessarily lead to better judgment); Paredes, supra note 2, at 418 (sug-
gesting that more mandated disclosure does not result in better use of the disclosure by investors). 
 257. Herbert A. Simon, Designing Organizations for an Information-Rich World, in 
COMPUTERS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 37, 40–41 (Martin Greenberger ed., 
1971). 
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mation and many more simply do not read it.259  Thus, despite a rise in 
the population of investors and a rise in complex financial instruments, 
financial literacy is in decline.260 
Changing how public firms disclose their risks can ultimately alter 
how firms draft their disclosure documents and how investors respond to 
them.  Because the new framework accounts for cognitive limitations 
and framing effects, the substance and presentation of the information 
will be more accessible and user-friendly.261  This accessibility, in turn, 
will change norms and expectations about the utility of securities disclo-
sures.  Behavioral studies indicate that expectations alone can change the 
utility of a product.262  Therefore, once investors, like consumers, be-
come reacquainted with the new and improved product, they will likely 
utilize disclosure more to educate themselves.263  Moreover, a renewed 
awareness in its utility will lead to a rise in its consumption because 
mandated disclosure imposes few direct monetary costs on investors thus 
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(1994) (“[M]ost investors do not read, let alone thoroughly analyze, financial statements, prospec-
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increasing readership and elevating financial literacy.264  Improved dis-
closures will create a positive feedback cycle where increased demand by 
investors for more meaningful, simplified disclosure will lead firms to 
become more transparent.265 
D.  Information-Technology Leverage 
Increased transparency and financial literacy would attract more in-
vestors to use technology to inform and educate themselves.266  This use 
would be consistent with the SEC’s recent initiatives to modernize the 
disclosure system.267  Beginning with the tenure of SEC Chairman Chris-
topher Cox in 2005, there has been a significant movement for the agen-
cy to leverage new information technology to enhance disclosure for in-
vestors.268 
In terms of the behavioral framework, the categorizations of risks 
lend themselves to easy comparison for investors.  For example, if an 
investor wanted to compare the catastrophic risks that are most likely for 
two investment banks, the investor can pull the disclosure of those firms 
from the SEC’s website and make an educated assessment.  Under the 
current ad hoc disclosure system, that type of comparison is not readily 
practicable. 
More importantly, once informational costs are reduced by en-
hanced disclosures, entrepreneurs will have more incentive to create pro-
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grams that summarize and repackage the information for wider consump-
tion.269  Enhanced mandatory disclosure can act as an open-source plat-
form for investors and entrepreneurs.  It is not hard to imagine an iPhone 
application or web-based tool that gives updates to people about changed 
Risk Factors or new catastrophic Risk Factors once informational costs 
are reduced significantly.270  Such informational advances will make fi-
nancial information more palatable to more investors.271  Therefore, en-
hancing the risk-disclosure framework can be a step towards democratiz-
ing and demystifying financial information for more investors.272 
E. Enhancing Arbitrage 
Critiques of behavioral approaches to securities regulation have 
suggested that such approaches are futile and unnecessary because arbi-
trage and efficient markets can adequately protect investors.273  The con-
tention is that regulators and firm managers274 also suffer from cognitive 
                                                 
 269. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 267, at 93–94 (discussing the power of open-source software 
and online communities); Charles Homan, The Geekdom of Crowds: The Obama Administration 
Experiments with Data-Driven Democracy, WASH. MONTHLY, July/Aug. 2009, 
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2009/0907.homans.html (“It used to be that if you 
wanted financial intelligence, you had to pay for the services of a ratings agency like Moody’s, 
where analysts made sense of the data tapes gathered in person from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. Now you can get a comparable analysis at Freerisk.org, a site launched by a pair of 
amateur programmers.”). 
 270. See, e.g., Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 223 (expounding the potential of disclosure-based 
regulation given modern information technology); Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED, 
June 2006, at 176 (“The open source software movement proved that a network of passionate, geeky 
volunteers could write code just as well as the highly paid developers at Microsoft or Sun Microsys-
tems.  Wikipedia showed that the model could be used to create a sprawling and surprisingly com-
prehensive online encyclopedia.”). 
 271. See Fanto, supra note 26, at 170 (explaining that while investors do not read lengthy 
disclosure documents, they are more inclined to read and benefit from summaries of such docu-
ments). 
 272. See Homan, supra note 269 (“[G]reater computing power, better software tools, and the 
ever-extending reach of the Internet have all democratized the once-rarified field of data use. Mak-
ing sense of huge piles of raw information used to require a degree in computer science, a university 
lab mainframe’s worth of circuits, and an awful lot of time. Now all it takes is an Internet connection 
and the ability to type in ‘Google.’”). 
 273. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of 
Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486 (2002); see also Choi & Pritchard, supra note 70, at 
5 (“If cognitive defects are pervasive, will intervention help?”); Stephen J. Choi, The Globalization 
of Corporate and Securities Law in the Twenty-First Century: Channeling Competition in the Global 
Securities Market, 16 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 111, 117 (2002) (“Even well intentioned regulators may 
face decision-making problems.”). 
 274. See Choi, supra note 273, at 117 (“Commentators have identified a great number of beha-
vioral biases under which all people labor.  Expertise may help alleviate some of these biases.  Cer-
tainly, many SEC staffers can claim a large degree of expertise in the functioning of the financial 
markets (as well as the various guises of fraud).  However, with expertise often comes several beha-
vioral illusions.”).  See generally Choi & Pritchard, supra note 70, at 5 (“If cognitive defects are 
pervasive, will intervention help?”); Posner, supra note 220 (“Behavioral economists are right to 
2011] A Behavioral Framework for Securities Risk 375 
limitations like investors; therefore, we should defer to the efficient-
market hypothesis275 and let a few sophisticated market players correct 
and signal the rest of the market through arbitrage and pricing.276  This 
line of argument, however, places too much faith in efficient markets and 
too little faith in individuals. 
In theory, arbitrage is the “process of earning riskless profits by tak-
ing advantage of differential pricing for the same physical asset or secu-
rity.”277  Theoretical or textbook arbitrage requires no real capital, as-
sumes no real risk, and operates in a realm of infinitely patient actors.278  
In reality, arbitrage requires much capital and an assumption of signifi-
cant risk.279  Mispricing of an asset allows an investor to arbitrage that 
asset.  In the short run, the investor may lose money until the differential 
prices converge and the investor will need additional capital and ample 
tolerance to maintain that position.280  Depending on how long the mar-
kets stay “irrational” or “inefficient,” this position could require substan-
tial capital and risk assumption, and markets, as John Maynard Keynes 
famously noted, “can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent.”281 
Additionally, arbitrage by a few select investors in a supposedly ef-
ficient market is not an optimal corrective tool because even the most 
sophisticated and well-resourced investors suffer from cognitive biases; 
and price is not always a good corrective signal in the short term.282  Ar-
bitrage by sophisticated investors can, in the near term, lead to a widen-
ing of mispricing and send erroneous signals to the market.  These cir-
cumstances lead to cascades of misinformation that cause a magnifica-
                                                                                                             
point to the limitations of human cognition.  But if they have the same cognitive limitations as con-
sumers, should they be designing systems of consumer protection?”); Seidenfeld, supra note 273 
(discussing how regulators can also be influenced by cognitive limitations). 
 275. See generally Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empir-
ical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970). 
 276. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 70, at 3 (“Under the Efficient Capital Market Hypothe-
sis, the ‘smart’ money will set prices and through the process of arbitrage will swamp the influence 
of the poorly informed or foolish.  Even the unsophisticated therefore can rely on market efficiency 
to ensure that the price he pays for a security will be ‘fair.’”).  See generally Eugene F. Fama & 
Kenneth R. French, Disagreement, Tastes, and Asset Pricing, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 667 (2007); Edward 
Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (2006). 
 277. WILLIAM F. SHARPE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 284 (1999). 
 278. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, The Limits to Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35, 36 (1997) 
(exhibiting how real-world arbitrage involves risk and requires capital). 
 279. Id. 
 280. See, e.g., Owen A. Lamont & Richard H. Thaler, Can the Market Add and Subtract? 
Mispricing in Tech Stock Carve-Outs, 111 J. POL. ECON. 227 (2003) (studying mispricing in U.S. 
technology stocks). 
 281. POSNER, supra note 71, at 92. 
 282. See, e.g., Fama & French, supra note 276; Lamont & Thaler, supra note 280; Shleifer & 
Vishny, supra note 278. 
376 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:325 
tion of individual and systemic risks.283  Therefore, arbitrage alone can-
not fully address securities risk.284 
This behavioral approach to disclosure does not seek to undermine 
arbitrage but to refine and enhance it, to make it work more efficiently by 
better informing investors.  While the regulator and regulated may both 
suffer from cognitive limitations, collective self-awareness of these 
shortcomings enables self-correction.285  Because cognitive limitations 
are easier to see in others, collective recognition makes redress more 
probable.286  This collective awareness is the nature of human collabora-
tion and human progress, and it can also be the nature of regulatory 
progress. 
CONCLUSION 
In the wake of the most recent economic crisis, many questioned 
whether ominous forewarnings about the crash existed.287  If so, why 
were they ignored?288  Why were disclosures concerning serious risks 
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disregarded?  What can firms do better to avoid being cast as Cassan-
dras?289  How can Risk Factors be amended to better communicate se-
rious risks facing public firms and the public at large? 
In an attempt to answer those questions, this Article critiqued the 
current securities risk-disclosure framework and demonstrated that its 
ineffectiveness is rooted primarily in the faulty fundamental assumption 
of the rational person as the reasonable investor.  Recognizing this short-
coming, this Article proposed a behavioral framework built on relative 
likelihood and relative impact of dynamic risks that accounts for the be-
havioral tendencies of real investors, not the unrealistic rational person of 
neoclassical economics. 
Furthermore, the proposed behavioral framework has several im-
portant implications for securities regulation.  First, this Article sug-
gested that the framework can lead to a better capture of securities regu-
lation.  Second, this Article contended that the framework can better ap-
peal to the underlying rationales of securities disclosure.  Third, this Ar-
ticle demonstrated that the proposed framework can reverse the decline 
in financial literacy and readership in a marketplace that is growing more 
complex.  Fourth, this Article discussed the opportunities under the pro-
posed framework to leverage information technology to proliferate en-
hanced financial information to more investors.  Lastly, this Article ar-
gued that the behavioral framework seeks not to undermine arbitrage but 
to enhance it. 
Ultimately, no securities regulatory framework is perfect, but the 
current framework can be greatly advanced by a framework that accounts 
for the behavioral tendencies of real investors. A behavioral framework 
for securities risk would improve risk awareness, reduce information 
costs, increase financial literacy, and refine arbitrage.  Before this new 
framework and similar regulatory approaches can materialize, people 
must recognize the limitations of the current system.  Securities regula-
tion is founded on an elegant, but faulty, assumption—that investors act 
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entirely rationally.290  This faulty assumption has resulted in a good, but 
flawed, disclosure-based regulatory framework that needs continual per-
fecting.  In order for disclosure to become a more powerful complemen-
tary regulatory tool, we must accept the need to address this faulty as-
sumption as an incompletely theorized agreement, meaning that while 
there may be disagreements about how best to address it, there should be 
a consensus about the need to address it.291  In a marketplace where in-
vestors, regulators, and managers all suffer from cognitive limitations, if 
we collectively recognize our shortcomings and construct mechanisms to 
mitigate their effects, regulatory progress becomes more achievable. 
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